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For  Russia,  migration  policy  –  in  terms  of  internal  or/and  international  migration  flows
management – was an ever-important element of the State activities. Concentrated on State
interests, the policy also resulted in human development. The paper presents a historical
overview of the Soviet and Russian migration policies with special emphases on the impact on
human development and the driving forces behind the changing policies. The Soviet period can
be characterized as contradiction between strict limitations on the freedom of movement
provided by the propiska system, and large-scale population movements, both voluntary and
involuntary, that were inspired by economic and administrative policy measures to meet labor
demand of an industrializing economy. In the post-Soviet period, international migration is the
major focus of the Russian migration policy. The Russian Federation is the major receiving
country in the vast former USSR territory. The evolution of Russian migration policy in the post-
Soviet period is a good example for getting a better understanding of how the everlasting conflict
between the need for additional human resources and anti-immigrant public moods (typical of all
receiving countries), combined with the opportunistic considerations of political elites, that
hampers the elaboration of a reasonable long-term migration strategy. Russian migration policy
has been drifting from a relatively open immigration regulation based on a laissez faire approach
in the early 1990s to restrictive immigration laws in the early 2000s and to an ‘open door’
migration policy in respect to CIS citizens in 2007.
Keywords: Human development, internal migration, international migration, migration policy,
Russia.
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that
presented in Human Development Reports.1
1. Introductory notes
The major difficulty in studying migration policy in Russia from the human development
perspective results from lack of research into human effects of migration trends and policies.
Traditionally, migration policy in the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and contemporary
Russia was shaped in accordance with the State interests and monitored from the State
perspective. The outcomes of migration policy for economic development of the country and
its regions, redistribution of population to meet the needs of industries, characteristics of
migrant flows, the role of immigration for demographic development, challenges of illegal
immigration for national security – these issues were earlier and are now well-studied in
contrast to elaboration of internal and international migration effects on human capabilities –
skills, health, education, political freedoms, etc.
Russian economic mentality is still allied with pseudo-Marxist approach to social
development where dominating growth of heavy industry at the expense of ‘live labor’ is
considered the most important characteristic of national development (Marx 1885; Cherkovets
1971). It must be admitted that the socialist system failed in Russia and other countries of the
socialist block mainly due to its irrational human outcomes. Real socialism turned to be a
mono-power and mono-property society with underdeveloped needs of the population and
even less possibilities to realize those needs; it was a society of ‘a cheap worker’ with no
purpose of high living standards (Kolesov 2008, 15). As a result, data collection and research
into migration of population focuses on its effects on the State, not people.
In the contemporary post-Soviet period, with dominating irregular migration patterns,
analysis of migration trends and their consequences is limited by the fact that 70 to 80% of
migration  inflow  remains  unregistered  (Zaionchkovskaya  2007;  Krasinets  et  al.  2000;
Ivakhnyuk 2008a; Vitkovskaya 2002), and therefore invisible to statistics.
By explaining these restraints for a systematic analysis of human development outcomes
of the Russian migration policy through different periods we shape the possible scale of the
discussion. This paper puts evolution of Russian migration policy in the center and analyzes its
human dimension at different stages in the context of its effects on migrants, households and
concerned societies, where corresponding data is available. Human development understood at
macro-level as development of human resources in the country, will also be investigated by
drawing from corresponding national statistics on employment, education, health, and social
security.2
2. Russian transcription definitions and acronyms used
Chelnok  migration  – a type of short-term commercial migration, either international or
internal, when migrants move back and forth (like a shuttle=chelnok) to buy and sell essential
commodities in order to fill up consumer market of their own countries with consumer goods.
Novoye/blizhnee zarubezh’e (new/near foreign countries) – countries of former USSR. To be
distinguished from staroye/dalnee zarubezh’e (old/far foreign countries) – all other countries.
Kulaks – a negative title of rich or well-off farmers in Russia in the 1920s who owned land,
cattle, etc. and were considered enemies of the new “people’s power” settled after the 1917
Revolution, in contrast to poor peasants (bednyaks) who were seen as natural allies of the new
regime.   
Orgnabor – a state labor recruitment system applied in the USSR in 1930s-1970s to provide
industrialization projects with labor resources, especially in remote areas. The movement of
people within the orgnabor system was stimulated both economically and psychologically.
Participation in the economic projects guided by the Communist Party and its Young League –
Komsomol was considered a matter of honor for the Soviet people.
Propiska = a compulsory territorial registration of the population applied in the USSR in 1932-
1991. Propiska  was  certified  by  a  stamp  in  a  person’s  passport  made  by  a  territorial
department of the Ministry of Interior. Every person was registered at a particular address, and
in accordance with registered residency he/she got access to employment, primary and
secondary education, healthcare, and other social benefits.
Perestroika – a period of economic and political reforms in the USSR between 1986 and 1991
initiated by the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991). Perestroika in the external
policy of the Soviet Union resulted in the end of the Cold War period.  Perestroika in the
internal policy was associated with putting an end to the apologetics of socialism, giving up
rigid state control over economy, shaping a trend to liberalization, democracy and openness of
the society, and freedom of press and discussion. In the context of the paper, perestroika was3
an important period in the Russian history as it was the first time the ‘human dimension’ of
development was acknowledged.
Raspredelenie is an administrative mechanism of the migration policy used in the USSR
(primarily in 1950s-1970s), and aimed at providing economic projects and remote areas with
required number of specialists (engineers, technicians, architects, teachers, doctors, etc.). It
was applied to university/professional school graduates (but also to qualified staff) who were
forcibly directed to definite employment locations despite their current residency for the
compulsory period of 3 to 4 years. (Presently, enforced raspredelenie of graduates is applied in
Belarus Republic in accordance with the Council of Ministers Decree N: 1702 of 10.12.2007
1).
CIS – the Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU – the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
EurAsEC – the Eurasian Economic Community
Komsomol – Young Communist League in the Soviet period
RSFSR – Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, the official title of Russia (as a part of
the USSR) during the Soviet period, between 1922 and 1991.
3. Abstract of migration policies in the Russian Empire in 18
th to early 20
th centuries
In Russia, throughout the Empire, Soviet and contemporary periods, a highly centralized
power system was the basis of the State management. Development of the huge country was
ruled from the metropolitan centre, be it Saint Petersburg until 1918, or later Moscow. The
need to populate and develop the vast territories made migration policy a permanent focus of
the State activities.
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3.1. Encouragement of immigration
Historically, the migration policy in Russia started with international migration management.
A major concern of Emperor Peter I (1682-1725) and later Empress Catherine II (1762-1796)
was how to inhabit and develop the huge fertile lands in the Central European part of the
Empire along the Volga river and stimulate agricultural development. As internal migration of
population  was  severely  restricted  by  the  existing  serfdom  system
2,  encouragement  of
immigration from European states became the source of additional population for Russia. In
1763, a specialized State Migration Management Department – probably the first migration
management board in world history – was founded to encourage colonists from Western
Europe to move to unsettled areas of rural Russia. In addition, thousands of skilled immigrants,
including scientists, professors, military men, engineers, architects and businessmen came to
settle in Russian cities. In the middle of the 18
th century, among 107 members of the Saint
Petersburg Academy of Sciences only 34 were Russians (Iontsev et al. 2001, 370). Privileges
were granted to immigrants, such as tax relief, freedom of conscience, and exemption from
military service. Since then, Russia has had numerous diasporas of Germans and Dutch. By the
end of the 19
th century, 1.8 million Germans lived in the Russian Empire, of whom 77 percent
were farmers (source: the 1897 Russian Census, cited from: Iontsev 1999, 186). Between 1764
and 1866, 549 colonies were founded by foreign resettlers in Russia with over 200,000 male
migrants alone (Brockhaus & Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary, 1890-1907, vol. XXIV, 672).
3.2. Internal migration
After serfdom in Russia was abolished in 1861, European colonists gradually lost their
privileges and internal migration became a major resource of colonization of the Empire’s
margins (Kaufman 1905). Freedom of movement for peasants had a great impact on the
economic development in Russia. It fuelled urbanization processes, gave rise to industries and
crafts,  and  increased  agricultural  productivity.   It  also  influenced  human  development
prospects by giving peasants the right to be independent farmers or to be employed in a non-
agricultural sector. Since late 19
th century the State encouraged migration of peasants from
                                                   
2 Serfdom is a feudal state system where peasants are attached to the land owned by a lord; their rights and
freedom, including freedom of movement, are severely limited; in fact, they belong to their lords who can buy
and sell peasants, exchange them, have them forcibly re-settled and married. This feudal system existed in Russia
in 16
th – mid-19
th centuries as well as in medieval Western and Eastern Europe.5
over-populated rural areas in European Russia to the Asian part of the country. They were
supported financially and provided with jobs, e.g. in the construction of the Trans-Siberian
Railway. All in all about 10 million people moved from Central European areas of Russia to
Siberia, Ciscaucasia, and the Far East between 1871 and 1916 (Narodonaselenie 1994, 234).
Besides, from 6 to 7 million peasants migrated for temporary (seasonal) employment every
year at the end of the 19
th and the beginning of the 20
th centuries (ibid).
During the 20
th century the management of population movements, though focused on
internal movements, in many aspects preserved the strictly centralized management system
and all-over State control over population movements.
4. The Soviet period – the ‘propiska’ era
4.1. Introduction of the passport/propiska system
At the beginning of the 20
th century Russia faced numerous population movements as a result
of the 1917 revolution and the 1917-1923 Civil War. Social transformations, economic
regression that resulted in shortage of goods and mass famine, in combination with tough
policies  of  the  Government  aimed  at  suppression  of  resistance  and  opposition  (by
collectivization of peasants, dispossession of the kulaks, etc.), forced people to move away in
search of better opportunities and security. Population movements were spontaneous, and no
migrant registration system existed in the early Soviet period. Neither was any unified
identification paper system in use for Soviet citizens. This situation was contradicting the idea
of total registration and State control of the population. For this reason, in 1932 a common
passport system for the whole territory of the USSR and a compulsory registration of the
passport holder at a specific address (propiska) was introduced by a Government Decree
(Moiseenko 2004, 88).
The passport became an exclusive identification document for Soviet citizens over 16
years of age and living permanently in cities, towns and industrial communities. Propiska was
verified by a stamp of a territorial department of the Ministry of Interior in the person’s
passport. A passport without propiska was considered invalid. A person could live, work,
study, vote, send children to school or pre-school, and have access to the social welfare system
only in accordance with his/her propiska, i.e. at the place of registered residence. For example,
it was absolutely impossible for a person with propiska in Novgorod to be employed in6
Moscow. In order to get propiska in a city, a statement confirming an employment in this city
was necessary. However, to be employed in a city, propiska in this city was compulsory. It
was, therefore, a vicious circle (Denisenko et al. 1989, 60).
4.2. Propiska and freedom of movement
In addition to the above measures, there existed a so called ‘sanitary norm’ of the dwelling size
that made it impossible to register a person in a house, flat or room where the ratio of square
meters per person was less than nine. This norm was applied with no respect to kinship, i.e. a
wife could not be registered (and get propiska with all pertaining social rights) in a dwelling of
her  husband  if  it  resulted  in  a  per  capita  area  less  than  the  legal  ‘sanitary  norm’.
Passport/propiska system seriously limited the freedom of movement of Soviet citizens.
Experts called the propiska system the ‘serfdom of the 20
th century’ (Popov 1996). Limitations
for  settlement  were  most  strictly  applied  to  big  cities  like  Moscow,  Leningrad  (Saint
Petersburg), Kiev, Kharkov, Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod), Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg). By the
1960s, of the total of 300 big cities in the territory of the Soviet Union (with population of over
100,000), about 200 cities were ‘closed’ for migrants (Regent 1999, 40).
It is worth noting that only urban citizens were granted the right to hold a passport, while
villagers (kolkhozniki) had no passports and therefore had no right to move even within the
borders of the administrative unit (province) where they lived (Moiseenko 2004, 89). Only in
1974, in accordance with a Decree issued by the Communist party and the Government,
peasants got passports and were equalized in the rights with other Soviet citizens (Popov
1996). This was mainly a result of ratification by the Soviet Union of the United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1973. Article 12 of the UN Covenant
declares that everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his/her residence. The propiska
institution was generally in conflict with this statement; but the fact that millions rural citizens
in Russia who were fully deprived of their right to move within their own country was an
outrage.
4.3. The scale and structure of internal migration in the Soviet period7
Despite the strict limitations of freedom of movement, the scale of internal migration in the
Soviet Union was large. First, there were voluntary (but strictly State-driven) employment-led
migrations: people were moved to large-scale construction and industrial sites within the
rigidly organized labor recruitment system (orgnabor). During the 1930s, over 28.7 million
people were re-settled across the Soviet Union under this system (Narodonaselenie 1994, 234).
These were mainly rural citizens recruited to construction and manufacturing sectors in urban
areas, and the urbanization process was accelerated in line with the industrialization policy. In
1926-1939 the urban population of the Soviet Union increased by 18.7 million, in 1939-1958 –
by another 24.6 million, in 1959-1969 – by 16.4 million, in 1970-78 – by 13.4 million, in
1979-1988 – by 9.1 million (ibid).
Moved  for  employment,  these  people  were  expected  to  settle  in  regions  under
development permanently. Resettlements to remote regions of Northern and Eastern Russia
were encouraged by a set of stimulating economic measures, including a traveling allowance,
‘regional wage increments’, early retirement and a higher pension, accommodation, annual
paid vacation with transport fares covered by the state, free vouchers to a health resort and so
on. For example, the wage increment rate (‘regional coefficient’) for the extreme north
territories was 1.8 to 2.0, for Far East region – 1.3 to 1.8 (Roshin 2008). In the centralized
planned economy where wage levels were standardized all across the country, this meant that
the same job done in the incremented territories was paid higher in accordance with the
‘regional coefficient’. The size of the coefficient depended on the climatic conditions and the
period of uninterrupted residence of the person in the corresponding area. Wage increments
were effective migration stimulating tools as they were not merely adjustments to cover
differences in living costs but also allowed migrants to make savings. For this reason, up to
60%  of  migrants  to  Northern  and  Eastern  territories  were  moving  temporarily,  under
temporary job contract, with the purpose to earn money for buying a car or a flat in a place of
permanent residence (Zaslavskaya and Rybakovskiy 1978, 22).  Besides, the benefits typical of
a situation blighted by a total deficit of consumer goods like an opportunity to buy a car or
other durable goods, were used to prompt migrants to go to remote and difficult-to-live-in
territories.
Voluntary by form, migrations under orgnabor were strictly determined by directions.
Migration to remote underdeveloped regions with severe climatic conditions was encouraged
while movements to developed areas, even for a family reunion, were limited. Regulated by
the propiska policy, migration was permissive by nature.8
On the other hand, involuntary (also State-driven) migration was an objective reality of
the Soviet Union, particularly in the 1930s-1950s. The migration policy was chosen as an
instrument of political suppression and struggle against dissent. Initially deportations were
aimed at well-off farmers (kulaks) who were dispossessed and – in order to avoid their
recovery  –  forcedly  moved  to  underdeveloped  northern  areas.  Later
deportations/displacements of whole ethnic groups (Crimean Tatars, Ingushs, Germans,
Chechens, Kalmyks, Koreans, and others) from their native lands to remote areas in Siberia,
Kazakhstan, and the Far East were aimed at destruction of their unity and ethnic identity.
Between 1932 and 1940, the number of so called ‘special resettlers’ (spetspereselentsy) as this
type of migrants was named in the official statistics, totalled 2.2 million; by 1953 their number
increased to 2.8 million (Bruk and Kabuzan 1991). During the Second World War, whole
ethnic communities were (often falsely) accused of assisting the German army and were
urgently moved to the Asian part of the USSR. Of these, over 1 million Germans, 317,000
Chechens, 165 Crimean Tatars, 84,000 Ingushs, 82,000 Kalmyks, 64,000 Karachaevs, 49,000
Meskhetian Turks were displaced. 78 percent of them were women and children. According to
estimates, every fifth of the migrants died on the way (Mukomel 1991). Upon their arrival to
respective destinations, the mortality among migrants was also high because of poverty,
diseases, bad housing conditions, psychological stress. According to estimates, from 15 to 30%
of ethnic deportees died prematurely on the way or soon after arrival to a new place of
residence (Ediev 2003, 302). The total demographic losses of deported nationalities in the
1930s-1950s (including the losses caused by reduced fertility) are estimated at 1 million
(ibid.).
The ethnicity-based deportations seriously affected human development in the Soviet
period, labeled whole ethnic groups as ‘public enemies’
3 and reduced their chances to chose a
place to live in and get access to higher education; it damaged the physical and intellectual
development of those groups, especially children, increased mortality and affected their health.
4.4. Migration management within a state planning system: the outcomes
The migration management in the Soviet period was coordinated with the general economic
and political strategy of the State.   The need for industrial development and cultivation of
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virgin  and  long-fallow  lands  called  for  mass  resettlements  that  were  encouraged  by
administrative and economic tools, while the trend for a total control over the nation realized
through the propiska system limited migration to big cities. The authoritarian migration
management ensured people would move to where the State interests needed them. The state
planning  covered  not  only  the  economic  development  of  the  country,  but  also  shaped
migration flows.
The impact of the migration policy on human development during the Soviet period was
contradictory. On the one hand, participation in orgnabor gave opportunities to young people,
particularly those from rural areas, to improve their living, be active in social life, get
professional skills up to higher education, and as a result expand their horizons. On the other
hand, propiska severely limited direction and scale of migration and left the people little
chance to decide their own destiny. Limitations of movement inhibited people’s development,
both in terms of professional and career growth and income earning. The search for better
employment opportunities was limited by area of residence fixed by propiska. For example,
for researchers in the provinces, work in the advanced research institutions in Moscow or
Leningrad  (Saint  Petersburg)  was  an  unrealistic  dream.  In  many  cases  it  resulted  in
underdevelopment of human capabilities (Khorev 1974). At the same time, the fact that in
order to earn money to buy a car or a flat a person had to take up an employment in faraway
regions of Siberia, the Far East or the Far North, can be hardly evaluated as ‘normal’
(Mukomel 2005).
Nowadays Russian researchers (Aleshkovski 2006; Moiseenko 2004; Roshin 2008) tend
to evaluate the Soviet experience of internal labor migration policy as positive because (1) the
orgnabor policy achieved its goals to supply the growing manufacturing and transport
industries with labor resources; (2) it succeeded in redistribution of the population across the
country and development of its Asian territories; (3) it attracted thousands of young people to
industrialization projects and helped distinguish the most initiative and active individuals who
later became administrative or political leaders. These arguments can be accepted, but the
‘philosophy’ and inhumane methods of the Soviet migration policy can hardly be approved.
The state migration policy was fully governed by the demands of the State, not people. The
interest of the state was the highest priority while the interests of its people were largely
ignored. If skilled workers were needed in Vladivostok, Novosibirsk, Almaty, or elsewhere in
newly developing remote territories, university graduates from Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev
were forced to take up jobs and stay there for several years. This was a typical way of10
supplying underdeveloped areas of the country with teachers, doctors, engineers and other
specialists.  It  was  called  ‘distribution  of  graduates’  (raspredelenie). It was only after
compulsory work for 3-4 years there that residents of Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev could return
home. The migration management was a natural result of the rigid system of planning and
administrative decisions mandatory for implementation (Aleshkovski 2006, 74).
This situation has deeply influenced the mentality of the Russians. It has damaged the
understanding of the role of individuals in their country’s development. The farfetched
economic ‘law’ put a heavy focus on the development of production means, including
machines, equipment and tools, while virtually ignoring production of consumer goods to meet
the basic human needs. The State policy was aimed mainly at economic growth and output
rather than on satisfaction of human needs. The mass repressions in the 1930s and the 1950s
minimized the value of human life: from 6 to 7 million Soviet citizens were executed by
shooting or died in prison-camps (Volkogonov 1990, 339). All in all, about 25 million were
subjected  to  repression  during  the  Stalin  rule  (Vishnevsky  2007).  While  the  Soviet
Constitution declared ‘universal’ human rights and freedoms, in reality people were often
deprived of their rights. Such type of double standard was considered normal by the majority
of the people. Forced and politically driven migrations swept millions of people and ruined a
lot of human lives, impressing a dramatic image on the nation’s character (Roshin 2008). This
explains inter alia why ‘human rights & freedoms’ is a difficult-to-understand value in Russia
even now, two decades after perestroika has revised priorities in favor of the ‘socialism with a
human face’ ideology (Vinogradov 2001).
Besides, the propiska system that limited the people’s mobility in the Soviet period has
had its long-term effect on the post-Soviet Russia. The low level of internal migration in the
contemporary Russia that impedes development of the national labor market and its progress
towards a market economy is psychologically deeply rooted in the artificial restrictions on
mobility imposed by propiska (Aleshkovski 2006).
4.5. International migration in the Soviet period
In addition to the above limitations of internal migration, it should be said that international
migration was an exception rather than a rule in the Soviet Union. For decades of the Soviet
regime the USSR was a ‘closed’ country where international migration was strictly limited by
the State. The entry and departure rules, granting and revoking citizenship and deportations11
were regulated by decrees and ministerial instructions issued in 1918, 1925 and 1959 that
reflected the restrictive stance of the State (Tiurkin 2005, 21-22).
Immigration  and  emigration  were  meager  in  number  and  mainly  of  a  political  /
ideological nature. Trips of Soviet citizens to other countries were regulated by severe security
checks: permission to go abroad was closely related to the ideological loyalty and political
allegiance of a candidate, even for tourists. To depart from the USSR, temporarily or
permanently, Soviet citizens had to get an exit visa. Membership in the Communist Party and
personal testimonial from the SPSU unit was a compulsory requirement for any person to be
sent on a temporary job to another country. Temporary labor migrants were sent as specialists
to participate in development and construction projects in the ‘satellite’ developing countries
like  Afghanistan,  Algeria,  Angola,  China,  Egypt,  Iraq,  Syria,  Vietnam,  etc.,  that  were
encouraged to follow the socialism model and given the economic and financial support.
Arrivals and stay of foreign citizens in Russia, for diplomats and tourists alike, were also
strictly controlled. International labor migrants from satellite countries (Poland, Bulgaria,
Yugoslavia, Vietnam, and China) came to Russia in teams to work in politically significant
projects (like oil & gas pipelines and power lines that were parts of the European socialist
energy supply system) or in manufacturing indutries. Another channel of temporary migration
to the USSR was student migration. The low-cost and high-quality education in the Soviet
universities and professional schools increased human capital of the Soviet Block states, and
supplied them with qualified doctors, teachers, engineers, geologists, etc. At the same time, it
was an effective way of strengthening the ties between the countries. The outer borders of the
USSR were effectively guarded. Illegal migration, if any, was negligible and concerned
criminal cross-border activities; it was effectively counteracted by security servcies.
5. Shift in migration trends and policies after the collapse of the USSR
In the Soviet period, the migration policy was focused exclusively on internal migration. For
the 15 former Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Ukraine), inter-republican migrations were external by form, although internal by nature.
This means that migration from Russia to Kazakhstan or from one Russian oblast (province) to
another were regulated by the same rules. Crossing administrative borders between the
republics has no special regulation. It was not until after 1991 when they became international12
borders, and crossing them in the 1990s was regulated specifically, with consideration of close
connections between people living in the former Soviet republics, and wishes of those who
preferred to change their country of residence after the USSR collapsed (no visa required, a
variety of documents were valid for crossing the border legally, including ‘internal’ (common)
passports, ‘travel’ passports, outdated Soviet passports, military identity cards, seafarer’s
identity documents, birth certificates, and so on).
Both on level of mentality and formal regulation, foreign countries (including other post-
Soviet states) were divided for the Russians into two groups labeled in the Russian language
novoye/blizhnee zarubezh’e (new/near foreign countries, i.e. countries of the former USSR)
and staroye/dalnee zarubezh’e (old/far foreign countries, i.e. all other countries). Different
entry regimes were a major dividing line between the citizens of these two groups of countries.
5.1. Migration-related legislation in the early 1990s – a liberalization trend...
Inspired by the perestroika reforms and a general liberalization trend, a new Russian Federal
law was produced in accordance with the democratic norms. The ‘young reformers’ team’ of
the early period of President Yeltsin’s rule embraced the democratic values and was filled with
enthusiasm  to  improve  the  Russian  political  system.  The  Constitution  of  the  Russian
Federation of 1993 was drafted in line with the UN International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and included its statements on freedom of movement in full. Correspondingly,
the 1993 Federal Law ‘On the right of citizens of the Russian Federation to freedom of
movement and choice of domicile on the Territory of the Russian Federation’ abolished the
propiska system in favor of a registration system. Formally, the requirements of registration
did not change much
4 but the enforcement of the rules was weakened.
Besides, Russia was becoming a more ‘open’ country and Russian citizens gained the
right to move abroad. Two decades after ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights its statement on ‘freedom of everyone to leave any country, including his/her
own’ was realized in the 1993 Federal Law ‘On regulation of departure from the Russian
Federation and entry into the Russian Federation’ that, among other things, voided exit visa
requirements for Russian citizens (Tiurkin 2005).   In accordance with the 1991 Law ‘On
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registration at a place of residence. However, since the registration limitations are still preserved this has not
eased the restrictions very much.13
employment of the population of the Russian Federation’, Russian citizens were given the
right for employment in other countries. Article 10 of the Law entitled ‘The right of Russian
citizens to work abroad’ declared that “the citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to
seek job and get employed outside the Russian Federation at their own will”. In 1995 the
Government Decree ‘On licensing activities assisting Russian citizens to get employed abroad’
was signed and approved by the Duma (Russian Parliament). The need for a legal framework
for overseas employment of Russian citizens was a result of the socio-economic crisis faced by
Russia that pushed people to look for alternative sources of income, including international
labor  migration.  An  attempt  to  channel  labor  outflow  was  aimed  at  shaping  Russia’s
participation in the international labor market and protecting the social rights of labor
migrants.
Liberalization of internal and international movements of Russian citizens in the 1990s is
hard to overestimate. Freedom of movement as one of the basic human values; freedom to
chose place of residence; privatization and establishment of private property; the State
withdrawing its control over private life; access to international education; betterment of
opportunities and income earnings by means of overseas employment, and widening choice of
life strategies have gave Russian citizens a feeling of freedom unknown before, increased their
mobility and made them part of the global community. However, impoverishment resulting
from the economic recession made those benefits inaccessible for a significant part of
population.
5.2. ... combined with unreasonable tangles
Liberalization of the migration management happened when the economic and political
situation served mainly as a strong push factor. This was true for Russia – and it caused a
large-scale emigration to the USA, Germany, and Israel, i.e. the countries that took into
consideration ethnic and political factors as reasons for admission of the ex-USSR émigrés.
This was true also for other former Soviet states – and it caused immigration flows to the
Russian Federation.  In addition, an unreasonably indifferent migration policy affected former
Soviet citizens who were staying in other post-Soviet states and wished to move to Russia to
escape ethnic conflicts, wars and poor state governance, but were not welcomed by Russia, and
flooded the country in millions. The status of those immigrants was undefined, and their social14
rights were infringed. People came to Russia benefiting from an easy visa-free entrance but
were not able to get legalized due to intricate bureaucratic procedures.
Russia is a country where bureaucracy
5 is traditionally very strong. 1.5 million people are
employed in the state service and federal and regional administrations of different levels
(Vishnevsky 2006). Giving permissions is the State prerogative associated with endorsements,
delays,  checks,  re-confirmations,  etc.  (Obolonsky  2002).  In  the  sphere  of  migration
management, the over-bureaucratic registration process became a major impediment of legal
immigration and a main source of corruption in the immigration process. Labor in-flow from
the CIS states, though badly required by Russian industries but clashing against an irrational
work permits procedure, has made migrants employment a largely illegal sphere.
5.3. Visa-free regime in the post-Soviet territory
Highly valued by people in the post-Soviet territory, the visa-free cross border regime is a truly
humane principle of the migration policy. It is the most ‘natural’ (however, questionable if one
were to consider the previous inhumane Soviet experience) border crossing regime in the
situation where new interstate borders have artificially separated families, relatives, and
countrymen; the result of decades and generations when people were living in a common
country called the USSR.
In 1992, an Agreement on visa-free entry of the CIS citizens to the territories of the member countries (the
so-called  Bishkek  Agreement)  was  signed  by  the  CIS  governments.  However,  in  1999  Turkmenistan  and
Uzbekistan, and in 2000 Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, withdrew from the Bishkek Agreement. Russia
explained it by the fact that of the joint CIS agencies cannot effectively counteract cross-border terrorism threats,
arms,  drugs  and  human  trafficking,  and  immediately  signed  bilateral  agreements  on  visa-free  population
movements with all the CIS members except Turkmenistan that insisted on a proper visa regime for all the post-
Soviet states. In 2001, visa requirements were introduced by Russia for Georgian citizens as a result of a political
tension between the two countries. In addition, an Agreement on visa-free movements was signed in November
2000 between the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) members (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Russia, Tajikistan). In 2006, Uzbekistan joined the EurAsEC and correspondingly the multilateral visa-free
Agreement. Thus, as of the end of 2008, Russia has visa-free migration agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.
                                                   
5 In the Russian language the term bureaucracy has a vividly negative side to its meaning because of abusive
practices, red-tape, corruption, bribery, and humiliation of ordinary people notoriously practiced by bureaucrats. It
is deeply rooted in the Russian history with long-standing mutual alienation between the bureaucracy and the
society based on non-transparency and mistrust.15
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All information for regular passports
— no visa required; V – visa required
5.4. A ‘repatriation’ trend
The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by a serious political shock in all former Soviet
republics. The dissolution of economic ties between them provoked a deep economic crisis,
job cuts, open and latent unemployment, and deterioration of living standards. Citizens of a
once indivisible country were suddenly divided into “those of our kind” and “outsiders”—
natives and immigrants. The latter were not guaranteed citizenship, inheritance, pensions,16
seniority, or other basic rights, and were subjected to laws requiring the use of the national
language. Replacement of ethnic Russians working as administrative officers, managers and
specialists with natives, and a policy to form ethnically homogenous states declared (openly or
implicitly) by new political elites
6 caused massive migration to countries of origin where at
least ethnic security seemed to be guarantied. These movements were called ‘repatriation’
7:
ethnic Tajiks were moving to Tajikistan, ethnic Armenians – to Armenia, etc. Russians were
moving back to Russia, and they were the most numerous ethnic group involved in those
forced, stress-driven migrations. Between 1991 and 1998, over 3 million ethnic Russians
resettled to Russia. It appears that under the post-disintegration shock those who were in their
own ethnic republics stayed home, while the mobility of non-natives increased, most of them
returning to their homelands either voluntarily or as ‘forced migrants’.
Moreover, the political, economic and social stress resulting from the collapse of the
USSR had serious negative effects on human development regardless of ethnicity: poverty,
unemployment, malnutrition, lack of medicaments, and growing inequality contrasted to the
Soviet low but equal and guaranteed wellbeing. The crisis especially affected the long-term
opportunities for human development. People were forced to survive rather than live and
develop. Most advanced representatives of the titular nations of the new sovereign states and
those who could rely on the former ethnic networks started moving to Russia with its huge
labor market and business opportunities. Totally, Russia received more than 12 million
immigrants  from  ex-USSR  states  between  1992  and  2007  (Rosstat  2008b),  while  the
aggregated number of registered labor migrants employed in Russia during the same period
was over 4 million (FMS 2008). Besides, there are millions of irregular migrants in Russia:
estimates vary from 4 to 10 million, of which 90% are unregistered labor migrants from
various post-Soviet states (please refer to section 9.5.). Thus, the Russian Federation has
become the major receiving country in the post-Soviet territory.
During the early post-Soviet years, development of the Russian migration policy was
influenced  by  two  major  factors:  (1)  lack  of  practice  and  knowledge  in  the  field  of
                                                   
6 Laws on status of the state language in newly sovereign states reduced the official use of the Russian language;
laws on citizenship introduced compulsory knowledge of the titular language as a requirement for the citizenship;
employment opportunities of non-titular nationals was artificially narrowed (for details please refer to: Yatsenko
et al., 2008).
7 Strictly speaking, the term ‘repatriation’ is not correct in the particular context of population movements in the
post-Soviet area. Repatriation means return to the native country/fatherland (patria) from a country of residence,
i.e. this phenomenon is related to international migration. Meanwhile, the native country of former Soviet citizens
was the Soviet Union as a whole, so when moving across the territory of the USSR they were internal migrants.
However, this term became popular in the Russian migration literature of the 1990s.17
international migration management; (2) huge inflow of former Soviet citizens from different
parts of the post-Soviet territory who had to be provided with social protection, including
access to public medical care and education systems, habitation, social benefits, provision of
pensions, etc. The situation was complicated by the fact that migrants to Russia were mostly
refugees or people in a similar position: they arrived from the areas of armed ethnic conflicts;
they  lost  all  their  possessions  and  needed  urgent  help.  This  explains  the  reactive  and
emergency-oriented character of the Russian migration laws in the 1990s.
5.5. Economic (chelnok) migration as an alternative to reduced employment opportunities
It is important to understand that education, healthcare, and accommodation were free in the
Soviet Union, and after migration to Russia from other former Soviet republics people
expected to have these benefits in their new place. Savings were minimal due to generally low
wages, and even those savings disappeared because of galloping inflation. The sudden and
rapid transition to paid services and accommodation no longer affordable marginalized
millions of Russian citizens and immigrants. Besides, immigrants to Russia in the early 1990s
were mainly well educated people: 20% of immigrants were people with university degrees
and another 35% were skilled specialists with professional school diplomas (Vishnevsky 2006,
313). However, they could not get jobs corresponding to their qualifications in the depressed
Russian economy, especially in the state sector that traditionally called for specialists.
Immigrants, alongside with Russian citizens, could not realize their human capital. Many of
them ‘migrated’ to the emerging private sector including commercial trips to other countries
(primarily Poland, Turkey, and China) with the purpose to buy and import small batches of
consumer goods to sell in Russia. They were called shuttle traders (chelnoks). This was the
most widespread type of circular cross border movements in the 1990s and a sort of ‘business
school’ for former Soviet people who had had no experience in free enterprise due to
understandable political reasons (Zaionchkovskaya 2003).
The Chelnok migrations played a great role in the development of small and medium
businesses in Russia. Commercial trips provided new entrepreneurs with initial capital and
nourished the development of related industries: international transportation, charter air
companies,  small-batch  and  retail  networks  and  markets  that  created  millions  of  jobs.
According to estimates, about 30 million people were employed in the cross-border and
internal chelnok migrations and related activities in the mid-1990s (Vorobyeva 2001b, 42).18
Participation in the chelnok migration was a desperate attempt of ex-USSR citizens to adapt
themselves to the new post-Soviet realities when the state sector was in decline while the
private sector was just emerging. Small-scale business aimed at meeting shortages of consumer
goods in the Russian internal market by means of imported goods was a form of ‘self-
organization’ of people in their attempt at beating unemployment, arrears of wages and
salaries, and reduced value of education. Many of today’s owners of small and medium scale
trade and transportation companies earned their start-up capital in chelnok trips (Iontsev,
Ivakhnyuk 2002, 67). In this particular case the laissez  faire approach of the Russian
Government that dominated its migration policy in that period had a positive effect on
opportunities for human development under the circumstances of the deep economic, political,
and social crisis.
5.6. Policies on emigration to non- former-Soviet states
The emigration from Russia in the 1990s was steadily high in comparison with that in the
Soviet period – 100,000 people per year on average (table 1). After a long moratorium on
travelling outside the Soviet Union, the Iron Curtain was lifted under Gorbachev’s rule.
Table 2. Emigration from Russia to non-former-Soviet states
by ethnic groups, 1993-2000
Russians Germans Jews Others Total
‘000 21.3 47.5 14.0 31.0 113.0 1993
% 18.7 41.7 12.4 27.2 100.0
‘000 24.1 47.1 13.6 20.6 105.4 1994
% 22.8 44.6 12.8 19.8 100.0
‘000 28.8 51.3 12.8 17.4 110.3 1995
% 26.1 46.5 11.6 15.8 100.0
‘000 29.2 38.6 12.5 18.3 98.6 1996
% 29.5 39.1 12.6 17.8 100.0
‘000 29.8 30.0 9.5 15.1 84.4 1997
% 35.3 35.5 11.4 17.8 100.019
‘000 29.3 28.3 7.3 15.4 80.3 1998
% 36.4 35.2 9.3 19.1 100.0
‘000 34.5 28.0 9.0 13.8 85.3 1999
% 40.4 32.8 10.7 16.1 100.0
‘000 25.8 22.6 4.5 9.4 62.3 2000
% 41.5 36.2 7.2 19.1 100.0
‘000 24.0 21.7 2.8 10.1 58.6 2001
% 40.9 37.0 4.8 17.3 100.0
‘000 21.7 18.3 1.5 12.2 53.7 2002
% 40.4 34.1 2.8 22.7 100.0
‘000 19.8 14.9 1.0 11.4 47.1 2003
% 42.0 31.6 2.1 24.3 100.0
‘000 19.2 12.2 0.7 9.9 42.0 2004
% 45.7 29.0 1.7 23.6 100.0
‘000 14.7 7.6 0.6 10.1 33.0 2005
% 44.6 23.0 1.8 30.6 100.0
‘000 9.2 2.4 0.3 6.2 18.1 2006
% 50.8 13.3 1.7 34.2 100.0
Source: Rosstat (1993-2007) Chislennost’  i  migratsia naselenia  v  Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[Population and Migration in the Russian Federation]. Annual Statistical Bulletin. (Moscow:
National Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation)  [in Russian].
The abolition of exit visa requirements in 1991 facilitated emigration from Russia:
between 1987 and 1992, the annual emigration from Russia to non-former-Soviet states
increased tenfold, from 10,000 to 104,000 (Goskomstat 1999). At first, only selective ethnic
emigration was permitted – that of Jews, Germans, and Greeks. However, the emigration boom
from the CIS, as many experts had feared, did not actually happen (estimates of possible
outflow from the former USSR territory varied from 1.5 to 50 million). The reason was a
restricted migration policy in major receiving countries. Few countries welcomed migrants
from former Soviet states, primarily on ethnical basis, namely Germany, Israel, and the USA.
Germany received about 550,000 emigrants from Russia between 1992 and 2000, i.e. 60% of
the total amount (approximately 900,000 émigrés). Israel received around 180,000 emigrants20
(20%). The USA, with its large Jewish community that welcomed Russian Jews, came third in
the top list of destination countries. In total, these three countries received 92% of Russia’s
emigration outflow as of 2000 (Iontsev et al. 2001, 317).
Table 2 proves that the emigration from Russia in the 1990s was definitely ethnic-based
with prevalence of Germans and Jews. However, the share of Russians was steadily growing.
In 2000, 41.5% of emigrants were Russians, while in 1993 they were made only 18.7%. This
structural shift was mainly related to a decrease in the migration potential of preferred ethnic
groups (Germans, Jews, Greeks, etc.) as those who had intended to emigrate had already
emigrated, and a growing number of well-to-do Russians who wished to change the country of
their permanent residence and immigrate as business migrants – investors, entrepreneurs, or
property owners
8.
A permanent and temporary outbound migration of Russian citizens for employment,
business,  or  education  has  become  an  ordinary  business.  In  the  2000s,  emigration  for
permanent  residence  was  gradually  replaced  by  contracted  employment,  ‘incomplete’
emigration, dual citizenship and other flexible types of migration typical of the globalizing
community. In 2006, emigration from Russia to non-former-Soviet states for permanent
residence was 18,799, and in 2007 – 15,684 (Rosstat 2008a). However, since many Russian
migrants receive education and live abroad for extended periods without registering their
formal departure from Russia, official data fails to give the full picture.
To President Yeltsin’s credit,   his administration did not follow the way of bans and
limitations, in contrast with the Soviet regime. Started by Gorbachev, liberalization of people’s
movements was formalised in the freedom of movement principle, and this principle has not
been revised, although it has caused some damage to the country, facilitating the “brain drain”.
“Brain drain” is the most painful migration trend for Russia. Emigration of scientists,
professors, engineers, researchers is often an irretrievable loss for the Russian intellectual
potential that has threatened existence of some branches of fundamental science and advanced
industries. For ‘intellectual workers’, movement to more developed countries was often an
uneasy but the only way to save their professional skills. The underfinanced Russian science
and R&D industry was in fact pushing people with academic degrees to self-survival in, for
                                                   
8 Despite very few reliable data, we can assume – from interviews with immigration agencies – that at least half
of ethnic Russians in the big outbound flow have chosen this immigration channel (Iontsev and Ivakhnyuk 2002,
60).21
example, petty trade
9 or emigration. The estimates of the “brain drain” impact on Russia are
impressive, but fragmentary and varying. It is often difficult to distinguish between temporary
intellectual contract migrants and students, and those who leave with an intention not to ever
return. The most reliable figure says that about 30,000 Russian intellectuals (people with
academic degrees) left Russia (and declared that) in the 1990s (Mozgi utekayushie 1998).
In general, the ‘qualitative’ characteristics of outbound migration from Russia were very
high. Of all emigrants to Israel, people with university degrees made a share 20 times higher
than that in average for Russia (Ushkalov 1998, 36). However, when in the destination country
their skills were often not required due to imbalance between supply and demand in definite
professions, language barrier, or non-recognition of their degrees. By the mid-1990s, The
emigrants to Israel from ex-USSR countries included 60,000 engineers (twice as much as in
the whole of Israel), 15,000 doctors, over 10,000 research and cultural workers, and over
25,000 teachers. However, three years after their arrival to Israel, only 27.4% of immigrants
were employed in accordance with their qualifications (Eckstein and Weiss 1997).
Temporary labor emigration of Russian citizens also became a widespread practice. The
official statistics provide data only about labor migrants employed in other countries in
accordance with inter-governmental agreements on construction & equipment projects or with
the assistance of licensed private recruiting agencies. In 2004, there were 55,903 Russian
citizens employed in other countries through these two channels; in 2005 – 60,926 people; in
2006 – 65,747. About 60% of them are marine crew members contracted for work in foreign
marine companies (Federal Migration Service 2007).
This data does not reflect the majority of labor migrants who have contracted their jobs
independently, by means of personal contacts, foreign labor agencies, internet, etc. or work
illegally. According to some experts, the total number of Russian citizens working abroad is
close to 1 million (Kamensky 2002; Vorobyeva 2001a; Iontsev and Ivakhnyuk 2002).
The State does not impede, neither facilitates labor emigration of Russian citizens. Even
when inter-governmental agreements on employment of Russian workers in other countries are
signed (with China, Germany, Finland, Slovakia, Switzerland, Poland, etc.) quotas for Russian
workers and trainees often remain unfilled. For example, the annual quota for Russian trainees
in Germany in accordance with the 1993 bilateral agreement is 2,000. However, it is regularly
                                                   
9 This process was called ‘internal brain drain’: about 2.2 million persons with academic degrees dropped out
from science in the 1990s, mainly to commercial sector (Ivakhnyuk 2006, 97).22
unfilled because of low skills in the German language among the candidates, while the Russian
side does nothing to arrange for necessary language courses (Ivakhnyuk 2005, 250).
5.7. Policies on immigration from outside the former Soviet Union
Since the collapse of the USSR, the geopolitical situation for Russia has radically changed, and
this has greatly affected immigration. Immigrants are coming to Russia mainly from countries
of Asia and Africa. Three major influxes of immigrants can be identified, different by their
goals in coming to Russia.
• Economic immigrants, looking for income opportunities and employment. These are
mainly Chinese and Vietnamese. Labor migrants from Turkey come to work for Turkish
construction companies contracted for projects in Russia.
• Refugees and asylum seekers from regions blighted by war or other stressful situations,
mainly Afghans and residents of some African countries like Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, etc.
(including university students and graduates who came to study and are unwilling to return
home). After Russia signed the UN 1951 Convention on Refugees in 1993, the refugee channel
was actively used by migrants from Asian and African countries, most often having an
intention to move further into EU countries.
• Transit migrants who are trying to use Russia as a conduit to western countries.
According to the Russian Ministry of Interior, there are at least half a million of transit
migrants from Afghanistan, China, Angola, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ethiopia and
other countries ‘stuck’ in Russia (Nelegalnaya tranzitnaya... 2002). The Border Guards argue
that there are around 1.5 million illegal transit migrants from Southern and Central Asia and
Africa in the country (ICMPD, 2006).
In 2006, about 600,000 people entered Russia with ‘transit’ declared as the purpose of
entry (of whom 220,000 persons entered from the territory of Kazakhstan). That is 2.5% of the
total number of arrivals of over 24 million. However, over 60% of arrivals were classified as
‘private visits’ (Rosstat 2007). Migration officers believe that this often signals an intention to
stay in Russia and get prepared for further movement to Europe
10.
The  major  concern  of  the  Russian  law-enforcement  bodies  is  countering  human
smugglers and traffickers who have created a well-organized network of illegal transit
                                                   
10 From an interview by the author with Deputy Director of the Federal Migration Service Vyacheslav
Postavnin on 18.12.2007.23
migration support. Between 1999 and 2003, over 500 organized groups of human smugglers
were detained. Numbers of tourist agencies penalized for human smuggling were 16,200 in
1998, 6,300 in 1999, 7,100 in 2000, and 8,900 in 2001
11. In 2000, Russia signed the UN 2000
Convention against transnational organized crime and two supplementing Protocols against
smuggling and trafficking of migrants. Correspondingly, new articles were introduced in the
Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in 2003.
5.8. Internal migrations – a ‘westward drift’
Internal migration in Russia is relatively low. In 2007, about 2 million people (1.4% of the
total population) changed their residence inside the country, of which less than a half moved
across  provincial  borders  (Table  3).  For  comparison,  in  1990  3.3%  of  the  population
participated in internal movements.
Table 3. Internal migration in Russia, 1992-2002, thousands
including




1990 4263.1 2415.4 1847.7
1991 3690.8 2071.0 1619.8
1992 3266.8 1760.6 1506.2
1993 2902.8 1511.3 1391.5
1994 3017.7 1544.9 1472.1
1995 3130.3 1653.3 1393.3
1996 2886.7 1577.0 1309.7
1997 2724.9 1484.1 1240.9
1998 2582.0 1416.8 1165.2
1999 2477.0 1366.1 1110.9
2000 2303.0 1284.6 1018.4
2001 2140.6 1204.8 935.8
                                                   
11 Data of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation.24
2002 2017.3 1131.4 885.9
2003 2039.0 1141.4 897.6
2004 1998.3 1146.4 851.9
2005 1911.4 1095.7 815.7
2006 1935.7 1095.7 840.0
2007 1998.0 1137.8 860.2
Source: Rosstat (1993-2008) Chislennost’  i  migratsia naselenia  v  Rossiiskoi Federatsii
[Population and Migration in the Russian Federation]. Annual Statistical Bulletin. (Moscow:
National Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation)  [in Russian].
The 2005 survey of population mobility conducted in 10 big urban centers of the Russian
Federation showed that 2/3 of urban citizens of working age (18-50 years old) had never
changed their residence and half of those born in other places had moved only once in their life
(Vishnevsky 2008, 246-247). This implies that urban citizens in Russia do not see migration as
a way to improve their lifestyles. The low population mobility not only contradicts the
economic  and  demographic  interests  of  the  country.  but  also  means  less  employment
opportunities for its people. Unemployment among people who have never moved is higher
than among those who have moved at least twice (ibid.).
The low population mobility largely results from a ‘poverty trap’ where people find it
impossible to cover migration-related expenses while the expected income growth after
migration is questionable, and housing opportunities are scarce (Aleshkovski 2006). With the
State taking an indifferent stance, in contrast to what was typical of the active migration policy
in the Soviet period (orgnabor, regional wage increments, free accommodation opportunities,
etc.), people are reluctant to move.
The well-shaped geographical vector of internal migration is westward, i.e. there is an
out-flow of population from eastern and north-eastern provinces of Russia to its western areas
that was called a ‘westward drift’ by some experts (Zaionchkovskaya 2007; Vishnevsky 2006).
Between 1990 and 2005 the Russian Far East lost 14% of its population (Vishnevsky 2006). In
the deep economic crisis in the early 1990s and the related hyper-inflation the regional wage
increments lost their importance to keep people in areas with rough climats.25





Central 2357.0 1569.8 787.2
North-Western 1104.2 1248.5 -144.3
Southern 1562.0 1378.7 183.3
Privolzhsky 2035.8 1774.7 261.1
Urals 1231.8 1312.7 -80.9
Siberia 1169.7 1440.8 -271.1
Far East 737.6 1472.9 -735.3
Russia in total 10,198.1 10,198.1 -
Source: The 2002 All-Russia Population Census:
http://www.perepis2002.ru/index.html?id=87
Table 4 shows that the territory of the Russian Federation is divided into two zones, with
the Central, Southern and Privolzhsky (along the Volga river) districts facing an inflow
migration, and North-West, the Urals, Siberia and the Far East facing an outflow migration.
Surprisingly, declines in production and rises in unemployment appear to have no visible
connection with migration patterns. Thus, the correlation coefficient between positive net
migration and unemployment is only 0.22 percent. Moreover, in many cases there is a reverse
link (Vishnevsky 2006, 334). At the same time, a connection between migration and the level
of development of the private economic sector is obvious. The southwestern part of Russia,
particularly along the border, differs sharply from the rest of the country in that it has a more
developed private sector. Apparently, it offers better opportunities for employment and
entrepreneurship (ibid).
In contrast to low mobility for permanent residence or employment, internal private
short-term commercial trips became a survival strategy for many Russian households in the
1990s. They were a spin-off of international chelnok migration (refer to section 5.5) and
provided local markets with imported consumer goods when the economy was unable to meet
even the basic needs of the population in essential goods like clothes, underwear, tableware,
etc. (Vorobyeva 2001a, 28-37). Internal chelnok migrations are difficult to evaluate but during26
1990s, until ‘civilized’ commercial networks were established in Russia, they provided the
biggest source of internal economic migration. It is estimated that every tenth household in
Russia was involved in chelnok migrations, either international or internal (Zaionchkovskaya
2003).
Commercial migrations are closely related to upward social mobility of population:
increased income, business-like manner of thinking, and commercial experience inspired
chelnoks to develop entrepreneurial skills and start small- and medium-sized businesses in the
country (Vorobyeva 2001a, 33). However, experts indicate that there were some negative
effects of participating in chelnok migrations, namely little social security, deterioration of
health and family relationships (Vorobyeva 2001a, 77).
6. Periodization of Russian migration policy in the post-Soviet period
The Russian Federation is one of the major receiving countries in the world. According to the
United Nations data, Russia ranks second (after the USA) in the top list of immigrant receiving
countries, with the total number of immigrants amounting to 13.3 million foreign-born persons
residing within its boundaries in 2005   (United Nations 2006). Like in other receiving
countries, the Russian migration policy is mainly focused on the management of permanent
and temporary migrant inflows.
Over the recent two decades, the Russian migration policy has been drifting from a
relatively open immigration regulation based on a laissez-faire approach in the early 1990s to
restrictive immigration laws in the early 2000s and to an ‘open doors’ migration policy for CIS
citizens in 2007. Following this pendulum-like trend we can distinguish four periods in the
post-Soviet Russian migration policies: (1) 1991-1995, when the government had to develop
an urgent migration legislation in response to the international migration boom, primarily for
the sake of refugees and forced migrants; (2) 1996-2001, when the focus in migration policies
shifted to dominating economic migrations; however, these regulations became increasingly
complicated; (3)  2002-2005, when the national security reasons came to the forefront as a
result of huge inflows of irregular migration, and brought about a tough migration policy that,
in turn, provoked a further growth of irregular migration; (4) ever since 2006, when the
migration policy in respect of CIS citizens radically shifted towards liberalization. Here, we
shall  examine  the  differences  between  the  four  periods  in  terms  of  drawing  up  and
implementing of the migration policy in Russia, the reasons and drivers behind these policy27
shifts, and their effects on human development in Russia and in the CIS countries being major
source countries for Russia.
7. 1991-1995: Response to the international migration boom
7.1. Migration as a reaction to the disintegration shock
The crumbling of the USSR resulted in a number of forced migrations
12 across the post-Soviet
territory. The push factors were mainly the ethnic-based nation-building processes in new
sovereign states: the rise of nationalism, infringements of civil rights of non-titular nations and
ethnic discrimination, fear to miss out on the privatization opportunities and to be deprived the
right to claim citizenship in the country of (ethnic) origin. Migrations in the first period were
mainly forced, occurred in a state of panic and were ethnically determined. The armed
conflicts in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan and Russia provoked numerous refugee flows. In
the first half of the 1990s as much as 5 million people were forced to leave their places of
residence in the areas threatened by armed conflicts: about 2.4 million left for other CIS states
(of these over 1 million received a refugee or a forced migrant status), and 2.2 million became
internally displaced persons. Later on, 1.6 million persons returned to their home regions
(Mukomel 1999, 69).
Families  divided  by  the  new  state  borders  faced  serious  challenges.  Increased
transportation costs and enforcement of the new visa regulations in some states (particularly
the Baltic States), and dangerous situations in others (the countries of the Trans-Caucasus,
Tajikistan, and Moldova) undermined their communication capacities. The breakup of the
previously uniform currency system limited peoples’ ability to provide a financial support to
family members living in other states.
In the early post-Soviet period a number of migrations between the newly independent
states happened, while the legislation in the sphere of international migration was equally
underdeveloped in all post-Soviet countries. The lack of experience in international migration
and its management was a major reason for the inadequacy of the law in that it failed to take
                                                   
12 The definition of a forced migrant in the Russian legislation, in terms of reasons for leaving, is not limited to an
imminent life threat as it is applied to refugees in international law. An ‘unbearable situation’ as a result of
persecution on political, ethnical, etc. grounds as well as an extreme economic, political, ecological situation are
considered reasons to grant a ‘forced migrant status’ for a certain period of time.28
into consideration the specific stressful situation in which the former Soviet citizens found
themselves after the collapse of the USSR. The most inexcusable omission of the early post-
Soviet period was ignoring the need for a continuous social security for former Soviet citizens
who moved to live and work in other parts of the previously united country. The system of
employment records was interrupted, pension funds were separated, and the USSR education
certificates lost their validity in a few newly established states. Hastily signed bilateral
agreements on social guarantees for migrants did not work because they were  too generalized
and not contain relevant mechanisms of implementation.
7.2. Gaps in the migration-related  legislation
The disintegration shock and vulnerability of forced migrants could have been mitigated by a
proper migration policy had it been developed in time. The need for proper migration laws and
rules was urgent in order to react to the large-scale migration in the early 1990s that was
difficult  to  coordinate  due  to  an  utter  confusion  of  norms  and  overly  complicated
administrative procedures for obtaining residence permits, work permits and citizenship, even
by former Soviet citizens.
The hastily developed migration legislation had a lot of gaps and inadequacies that
affected people coming to Russia. The borders were remained semi-transparent. A poor border
control and a visa-free entry regime between most of the post-Soviet countries could not stop
people who were pushed by economic crisis, military conflicts, and ethnic-based pressure.
Between 1992 and 1996 about 5 million of the former Soviet citizens came to Russia from
other ex-USSR republics for permanent residence. Most were granted a proper legal status
and/or Russian citizenship. However, the gaps in the Russian legislation on migration
13 and a
tough law of citizenship
14 resulted in over 3 million permanent migrants staying in Russia
without any status as of 2002 (Iontsev, Ivakhnyuk 2002, 52). They were not irregular migrants
in the ‘classical’ understanding of this term: they were not hiding from Russian authorities,
they were staying in Russia with their families for years, owned property and worked; their
children attended schools and universities, they were dealing with any trouble by bribing the
                                                   
13 For example, since 2002 regulation of the legal status of foreign citizens (including ex-USSR citizens) in
Russia has been realized in accordance with an utterly obsolete “Regulations of stay of foreign citizens in the
USSR” issued 26.04.1981. Co-existence of a number of laws and regulations hastily designed in the 1990s,
spawned discrepancies and contradictions in their application.
14 Adopted in 1991 as Law ‘On citizenship of the RSFSR’, amended  in 1993 and 1995.29
officials; however, they could not get a lawful residence permit and Russian citizenship due to
the discrepancy between the ‘old’ (Soviet) and the ‘new’ (Russian) regulations
15. The rights of
these migrants were limited and their legal status was uncertain. In fact, they were treated as
irregular migrants. Their situation was a negative example for millions of other ex-Soviet
citizens
16 who wished to move to Russia.
On the one hand, the regulation of this period had an liberal approach  towards former
Soviet citizens in that it made no difference between the Soviet citizenship and the Russian
citizenship (the Soviet passports remained valid in the post-Soviet territory until early 2000s).
Later on this resulted in political infringements of immigrant rights in Russia and difficulties in
applying for the Russian passport after 2000. On the other hand, the fact that no distinction
was  made  between  refugees  from  former  Soviet  republics  (Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  or
Tajikistan), who had been citizens of the united country only a couple of years before, and
asylum seekers from countries like Afghanistan, Somalia, or Ethiopia, seemed unfair. The
Federal Russian laws ‘On Refugees’ and ‘On Forced Migrants’ (1992) drew a line between
internal forced migrants and international refugees, but equaled in rights asylum seekers from
elsewhere including former USSR republics.
By the mid-1990s it had become clear that Russia was in fact unable to carry out its
obligations towards refugees which it had assumed following its participation in the 1951 UN
Convention relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 Protocol. Between 1992 and 1995,
1.4 million people were granted a refugee or forced migrant status
17 in Russia; however, their
status was limited in time and their access to financial support and social benefits did not
correspond to the requirements of the Convention as Russia and its population were suffering a
deep economic crisis (Vorobyeva 2001b). Initially, applicants, especially those from the CIS
states,  were  granted  the  refugee  status  semi-automatically,  without  proper  personal
consideration (Regent 1999, 226). The revision of the laws ‘On Refugees’ and ‘On Forced
Migrants’ in 1995 made them more detailed and formalized the application procedure. For
                                                   
15 For example, migrants couldn’t prove the date of their entry to Russia as border crossing was not verified b a
stamp in their Soviet passports.
16 The total size of Russian community that outside Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union is estimated at
24 million. Surely, not all of them were definitely intending to move to Russia but the migration potential among
them was high. By mid 2000s, the potential of permanent migration to Russia from post-Soviet states is estimated
by some experts at no more than 4 million. (Vishnevsky, 2006, 320). This decline can be explained by an
improved economic situation in the countries of stay, mitigated ethnic tension, successful adaptation, etc.;
however, it is largely the extra-strict migration laws in Russia that have had its dramatic effect.
17 According to the Russian legislation, the refugee status (for international migrants) is granted for 5 years and
forced migrant status (for internal migrants) – for 3 years. After this period, irrespective of personal situation of
an individual or situation in his/her country of origin, the status is terminated.30
example, to get a ‘forced migrant’ (vynuzhdenniy pereselenets) status, a former Soviet citizen
had to leave a place of his/her residence, prove his/her permanent (not temporary) stay in the
territory of a former Soviet republic, prove his/her emergency situation, and apply for the
Russian citizenship (Mukomel 2005, 117). For those who could not meet these requirements,
the institute of a ‘temporary asylum’ was introduced; social guaranties for this humanitarian
category were minimized (ibid.).
Thus,  the  design  of  migration-related  laws  in  the  early  post-Soviet  period  was
complicated by a lack of experience in migration management, the need for migration laws and
rules was very urgent, often to the detriment of their quality, as well as a lack of specialists
able to develop detailed legal documents and foresee their effect.
7.3. Founding of the Federal Migration Service
As a response to the growing numbers of migrants, the Federal Migration Service (FMS) was
founded in 1992 as an independent state institution responsible for migration-related issues. In
the early period of its operation it fully concentrated on the issues of forced migrants which by
then had become extremely problematic. Territorial units of the FMS were set up in all the
Russian provinces, while in the most affected provinces centers of temporary accommodation
for forced migrants (refugee camps) were organized.
FMS  was  involved  equally  in  international  and  internal  migration  issues.
Accommodation, support and compensations for internal forced migrants fleeing from areas of
armed conflicts was a major focus of its activities. Forced migrants from the Chechen Republic
to neighbouring North Caucasian republics was one of the most pressing issues. In 1996, of the
15,900 forced migrants placed in temporary accommodation centers, 87% were staying in the
centers located in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya (Mukomel 2005, 132). Failure to
pay proper compensations for the lost property to migrants from the Chechen Republic was a
reason for repeated complaints of migrants and human rights NGOs. Later, in 1998, these
complaints culminated in a special commission being set up to review the agency’s activities
which found its operation unsatisfactory and forced FMS head T. Regent to resign.31
8.  1996-2001: Focus on economic migration
8.1. Shifts in structure and scale of migration flows
The second period is characterized by a relative stabilization of political and social situation in
the CIS countries and termination or freezing of armed conflicts. As a result, the volume of
forced migrations went down. In Russia, the peak of migrant inflow was passed in 1994 when
it received over 1 million of immigrants. By 1996, the immigrant inflow had reduced twice
(Goskomstat 1999). This happened mainly because less Russian-speaking population in source
countries wanted to move top Russia having gradually adapted to the new political and socio-
economic conditions, and because the political situation in the CIS countries had improved,
and less nationalist rhetoric and discriminating slogans were used (IOM 2002).
At the same time the structure of migration flows was shifting in two aspects. Firstly,
among migrants for permanent residence, the share of Russians was declining while that of the
titular nations of former Soviet republics was growing. Between 1993 and 2000, the latter was
about 850,000 people, i.e. 22% of the total 3.8 million inflow of permanent immigrants. Of
these, Ukrainians totalled 312,000 people, Armenians – 261,000, Azeri – 92,000, Georgians –
51,000, Tajiks – 32,000, Uzbeks – 22,000 (Vishnevsky 2006).
Secondly, the structure of the migrant inflow was shifting in favor of temporary labor
migrants. Temporary employment-driven migrations were booming, though they were not
properly reflected in statistics as employment of migrant workers was often unregistered. The
economic recovery of Russia had started earlier and was more robust than in most of other ex-
USSR states. This created incentives for labor migrants pushed from their countries of origin
by the poor economic situation, unemployment, and low standards of living and drove them to
Russia which was doing better in its transition to a market economy.
Visa-free border regulations, historical  understanding of the post-Soviet territory as a
common country, the knowledge of the Russian language provided ‘psychological easiness’ of
going to Russia rather than to any other country outside the former USSR. In the 1990s Russia
signed bilateral agreements on labor migration with the majority of CIS countries. However,
these agreements were not followed by subordinate arrangements and programmes and they
were not incorporated in the scope of relevant ministries, so their effectiveness was low.
Between 1994 and 2001, the total number of foreign workers officially employed in Russia
was more than 1.5 million. In 2001 alone, there were 283,700 labor migrants hired officially,32
in accordance with the legal procedure; among them 50% were from the CIS states (see
Annex, Table 1).
8.2. Growth in irregular migration
Meanwhile, the unregistered employment-driven migration a way times bigger. Since the
opportunities for legal employment were rather narrow (not because of a lack of jobs but due
to an inadequate system of foreign workers recruitment) and the migration out-flow potential
in Central Asian states, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus republics was growing, first of
all, due to a protracted economic recession and, in case of Central Asian states, due to a
demographic pressure
18. With meager employment opportunities in their home countries
migrants from smaller post-Soviet states were arriving for irregular employment. They found
jobs as seasonal workers in construction, agriculture and service sectors.
The overly bureaucratized and artificially complicated procedures of migrant registration
and work permit application pushed both migrants and employers out of the legal field. For
Russian employers, the administrative procedure of getting a license to hire foreign labor force
and – as the next step – getting work permits for individual foreign workers was time-
consuming and involved bribing. Meanwhile, thousands of job seekers from the CIS were
already in the Russian territory and ready to start working at any moment and on any terms.
This was the stimulus for wide-spread illegal employment practices, especially when the
control was low and penalties were nominal.
Table 5 is based on the official data of the Russian National Committee on Statistics
(Rosstat) on the numbers of issued work permits and national origin estimates of regular and
irregular labor out-migrants. It proves that the actual number of labor migrants from CIS states
in Russia is from 10 to 20 times higher than the officially registered labor migrants. Some
Russian  experts  estimate  the  number  of  irregular  labor  migrants  at  3  to  4  million
(Zaionchkovskaya 2003; Krasinets et al. 2000; Vitkovskaya 2002), while the FMS officers
come up with bigger estimates – 6 to 10 million (estimates of the FMS directors and senior
officers in early 2000s, cited in: Ivakhnyuk 2004).
                                                   
18 In the Central Asian states, the labor market narrowed by economic recession and dissolution of economic ties
with other post-Soviet states, seems unable to absorb a growing numbers of young people entering the working
age. By 2025, the share of population of the working age will increase in all Central Asian countries: in Tajikistan
from 59% in 2000 up to 65% in 2025; in Uzbekistan from 58%  up to 68%; in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan from
60 up to 68%. Totally, population of the Central Asian states between 2000 and 2025 will increase for 16.5
million while population of Russia will decrease for 17.3 million (World Bank 2007).33
Table 5. Numbers of regular and irregular migrant workers from CIS states
in the Russian Federation, early 2000s












*   Based on the data from the Russian National Committee on Statistics (Rosstat)
** Based on national estimates of source countries.
Sources: Overview of the CIS Migration Systems. ICMPD, Vienna, 2005; Trud i zaniatost v Rossii
[Labour and Employment in Russia]. Statistical Bulletin. Rosstat, 2001-2005 [in Russian].
The prevailing irregular migration and illegal employment of migrants is also a result of
the specific economic system in Russia with its sizeable shadow economy and informal labor
market. It is estimated that the Russian shadow sector produces more than a quarter of the
country’s GDP and employs 15 to 30% of the total labor force (Radaev 1999, 10).
During the 1990s, the general principle of the Russian migration policy was mainly
laissez- faire, i.e. the government professed noninterference with the scope and structure of
migration inflows and out-flows. No limitations, quotas or selective mechanisms were set by
the Russian migration legislation or applied in practice. The major purpose of the Russian
migration policy was to cope with refugees and forced migrants; however, even this ‘narrow’
purpose was not implemented properly as many people found themselves in a dire situation
once their refugee or forced migrant status ended (Zaionchkovskaya 2002).34
   The migration pressure from Central Asian and Caucasus republics as well as from
Ukraine and Moldova, both economies less successful in their post-Soviet transition, faced a
deficit in proper regulation of emigration to Russia for purposes of short-term or permanent
residence and employment. As a result, migrants from CIS states who easily crossed the
transparent interstate borders could not legalize their status when in Russia and would turned
into illegal immigrants. Irregular migration from outside the former Soviet Union also
increased during this period. From 1996 to 2000, the number of illegal migrants arrested on the
border increased tenfold (Vorobyeva 2001b). Russia was selected as a relatively convenient
and cheap destination for transit migration to the European Union by international networks of
human smugglers and traffickers (IOM 1995; 2002; ICMPD 2006). The 09/11 factor also had
an  alarming  contribution.  Uncontrolled  migration  flows  were  considered  an  additional
destabilizing factor and rated as a national security threat.
8.3. Economic migrations: effects on migrants and source countries
The above mentioned shifts in migration situation in the late 1990s, especially the growth of
economic-driven migrations, had important economic and social effects on source countries.
Already in this period labor migration to Russia was seen by many households as an
important survival strategy in the conditions of a deep economic decline. Surveys showed that
by the end of the 1990s every third household in Moldova and Armenia had at least one family
member working abroad, primarily in Russia. In Ukraine, 25% of citizens participated in
temporary, seasonal or circular cross-border migrations (Zaionchkovskaya 2003). The role of
money transfers by labor migrant in sustaining and improving the wellbeing of their families
was shaped already in late 1990s. For example, in Armenia the share of earnings by labor
migrants in the total income of migrant households was estimated 15 to 20% (Arutiunian
1999). In Tajikistan, where the average monthly wage was equal to 9 USD in 1999, the income
of a seasonal out-migrant of 500-700 USD per season could cover the household expenses for
the whole year (Maksakova 2002, 8).
Migrants became more pragmatic and reasonable in their choice of the form of migration.
Forced migrations driven by a purpose to survive in any way and anywhere, were replaced by
a well-reasoned choice of the destination and the mode of migration (permanent emigration,
temporary labor migration, seasonal migration, or circular migration). Migration has become a
free choice of people, and migrants were able to make their plans, coordinate them with other35
aspiring migrants, and develop contacts with those who had already settled in abroad. Migrant
networks were rapidly developing in Russia (Diatlov 2003). Later they would encourage and
promote further migrant inflow from their origin countries to Russia.
An opportunity to work and earn in neighboring Russia increased the social stability in
the post-Soviet region. It reduced the risks of social outbursts in smaller ex-USSR states (and
correspondingly, the challenges of new refugee flows) by providing migrant households with
additional income, reducing poverty, creating an alternative system of social security.
Involvement of population of former Soviet republics, in particular of Central Asian and
Caucasus nations, in migration flows, both permanent and temporary, was in a striking contrast
to the Soviet period when the mobility of these nations was very low. According to the 1989
USSR Population Census, 88% of Kyrgyz people lived in the Kyrgyz Republic (and 98% - in
the Central Asian area). For Uzbek people the same figures would be 85% and 97%, for
Turkmen people – 93% and 98%, for Tajik people – 75% and 99% (The 1989 USSR
Population  Census).  A  rise  in  the  people’s  mobility,  though  caused  by  an  extremely
unfavorable economic situation in a short run, can have had a positive long-term effect as it
has been an important element of transition towards the market economy that implies a flexible
labor market.
8.4. Early attempts to conceptualize the State migration policy
In this period there were first attempts to conceptualize the State migration policy. The
Concept of the State Migration Policy of the Russian Federation had been under consideration
since 1996. The Concept was to define what the State attitude towards immigration and
emigration  was.  Development  of the Concept  was  followed  by  discussions  among  the
interested state authorities and experts. Academics insisted that given the demographic crisis in
Russia and forthcoming labor shortages, the Concept should clearly explain to the society and
migration managing bodies that Russia is in need for migrants and it welcomes those who
come legally to work and live here. The initial drafts of the Concept wrapped up the goal of the
Russian migration policy as “reasonable management of migration flows for the sake of
realization of intellectual and labor capacities of migrants and achievement of sustainable
socio-economic development of the Russian Federation” (Konseptsia 1999).
However, the rising security concerns after 11.09.2001 and strengthening of the hardliner
stance in politics resulted in serious revisions of the Concept in 2001-2002. As a result, the36
final version of the Concept  was named the Concept of Migration Processes Management in
the Russian Federation and was given an absolutely different core idea of fighting irregular
migration (Konseptsia 2002). It was adopted in 2002 as the official guideline for purposes of
the Russian migration policy. An illogical and confusing document, the 2002 Concept was an
unsuccessful attempt to combine the Russia’s need for migrants with an inapt management of
migration flows. A lack of strategic vision of the role of international migration in the
economic and demographic development of Russia compromised the capacity of the 2002
Concept  to  harmonize the migration-related laws,  which  by  that moment had  become
contradictory and difficult-to-follow (Mukomel 2005, 33).
8.5. Institutional reshuffle
Institutional reshuffle of migration responsibilities also contributed to the fact that benchmarks
of the Russian migration policy at the dawn of the 2000s were in confusion. In 2000, the
Federal Migration Service was abolished because it had failed to protect the rights of refugees
and forced migrants, not to mention its inability to cover the whole range of migration-related
issues in its scope of work. The responsibility to manage migration processes were handed
over to the Ministry of Federation and National Policy. However, in 2001 the Ministry was
closed down
19 and after a six-month delay the Federal Migration Service was re-established,
this time as part of the Ministry of Interior of the Russian Federation.
The leapfrog with responsibilities of migration regulation resulted from an imperfect
migration legislation rather than activities of the Federal Migration Service which is an
executive body. Delays in drafting and adoption of the federal laws on citizenship and legal
status of foreign citizens created a lot of legislative traps and deadlocks that stirred up a lot of
complaints on the side of migrants who could not get legally established, and migrant human
rights protecting NGOs. In accordance with the 1993 Law ‘On citizenship of the Russian
Federation’, a facilitated procedure of obtaining the Russian citizenship by ex-USSR citizens
came into effect within three years only. Appended with a confusing list of compulsory
supporting documents required to prove the eligibility for the facilitated procedure, this law in
fact prevented many immigrants from getting the Russian citizenship. Legalization of foreign
citizens in Russia regulated by the law inherited from the Soviet period also provoked a growth
                                                   
19 The Russian Federation – a multinational country with millions of immigrants of non-Russian origin – has not
had a specialized government board on national policies ever since!37
in the number of migrants who could not legalize their status (refer to section 9.3). The society
severely criticised the Federal Migration Service as the major migration managing body.
9.  2002-2005: A tough migration policy
9.1. Security priorities
Under President Putin, the institutional structure and ‘ideology’ of Russian Government was
revisited. Strengthening of the political structure and recent security concerns, the defense and
law enforcement agencies demanded a wider field of activities under the guidance of the army
and police. Aiming at neutralization of the security challenges, the government chose to rely
on force and, as a result, to throw the police into the battle against illegal migrantion.
In this period the official attitude to migration was strongly negative. Big numbers of
illegal migrants staying in Russia and a lack of effectives measures to counteract the illegal
migration made the Russian Government rate it as a national security issue. A rise in  crime
among migrant communities stressed by the law enforcement bodies along with the world-
wide trend to link irregular migration with international terrorism, aggravated by the media,
created a generally negative image of a migrant in Russia and fuelled intolerance in the
society. In this context, further development of the Russian migration laws changed towards
restrictions.
9.2. Migration management under militia
In 2002, the Federal Migration Service was reassigned to the Ministry of Interior of the
Russian Federation. The major problem of this institutional shift was that the Ministry of
Interior had no experience in managing migration. In the Soviet period territorial departments
of the Ministry of Interior executed passport control and registration of people’s domiciles
including migrant registration in accordance with the propiska system. Management of internal
migration  was  conceptually  and  practically  realized  by  the  State  Planning  Committee
(Gosplan). In the post-Soviet period migrants (both internal and international) registration
functions were performed by the Federal Migration Service. Besides, the Ministry of Interior
had no experience and skills to work with migrants or human rights organizations (by that time
NGOs specializing on protection of migrants rights were numerous in Russia as a response to38
ineffective work of the FMS that resulted in violation of migrant rights) (Mukomel 2005, 133).
The Ministry of Interior was a typical law-enforcement body aimed at maintaining order by
any means with the emphasis on coercive methods. Any individuals, especially migrants, are
seen as potential criminals by militia officers.
Since 2004 the Federal Migration Service has operated under supervision of the Ministry
of Interior but also under direct guidance from the President of the Russian Federation who
determines the FMS functions and nominates the FMS director and vice-directors
20. Thus, the
Russian migration policy became a major priority of the presidential policy, and all further
revisions and amendments of the State migration policy would be initiated directly on the
President’s instructions.
In addition to immigration control and registration of migrants, the functions of the
Federal Migration Service were expanded when passport services were included in its scope of
competence in 2004. The headcount in FMS grew from 3,000 to 18,000 officers between 2001
and 2005 (Mukomel 2005).
Negative results of reassignment of migration issues to militia became obvious very
soon. First of all, the operation of the reformed Migration Service became non-transparent.
Secondly, the level of qualifications of the FMS staff lowered as many experienced workers
had resigned or retired. Also, the relationship between the FMS and NGOs deteriorated.
Finally, cooperation with academic experts was neglected.
Importantly, the systematic bribery made illegal migrants a huge source of income for
Russian militia officers. In big cities with a high migrant concentration the city blocks were
divided between groups of ‘inspectors’ who regularly harvested bribes from migrants in
exchange for letting them carry on with their work.
Later on, some high-rank Russian officials admitted that placing the migration policy
under control by the Ministry of Interior had been a mistake. The Head of the Council of
Federation S. Mironov announced that poor governance of migration issues by the Ministry of
Interior did not help solve a single related problem; worse, it multiplied corruption
21 .
                                                   
20 According to the President Decree N:314 ‘On System and Structure of Federal Administrative Boards of the
Executive Power’ of 9.03.2004 and the President Decree N:928 ‘On Federal Migration Service’ of 19.07.2004.
21 Interview of Sergey Mironov to Intefax News Agency (Vedomosti, 23.07.2008)
http://www.vedomosti.ru/newsline/index.shtml?2008/07/23/62797339
9.3. Shift in focus of the migration-related legislation
In 2002, the long-awaited Federal Law ‘On the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the
Territory of the Russian Federation’ was approved (No. 115-FZ of July 25, 2002). In fact, it is
the principal law in the Russian Federation governing the relations between foreign citizens
and state authorities in the sphere of residence, employment, etc. This Law was to replace the
dramatically outdated ‘Regulations of stay of foreign citizens in the USSR’ issued 26.04.1981.
During 1997-1999, the draft law would be repeatedly discussed and approved by the State
Duma (the lower chamber of  the Russian  parliament) but   rejected by  the Council of
Federation (the upper chamber of the Russian parliament) or the President. The final draft was
prepared by a working group headed by Viktor Ivanov, an officer from the Putin’s team who
was then Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration. The 2002-2005 period of a tough
migration policy in Russia is closely related to the activities of this working group. Its security-
driven strategy dramatically influenced the laws on citizenship, on legal status of foreign
citizens and the concept of the state migration policy. There were even attempts – though
unsuccessful – to revise the law on freedom of movement of Russian citizens towards its
restriction (Mukomel 2005, 119,156)
The new Law of the Legal Status of Foreign Citizens was expected by the society to
regulate the legal situation of millions of non-status migrants in Russia and set transparent
procedures for obtaining temporary and permanent residential status for new migrants.
However, due to the domination of security reasons it became increasingly prohibitive for the
citizens of former Soviet republics.
Based on the wording of the Law, the entire system of immigration management became
oriented towards maintaining tight control over the number and structure of migrants coming
for  a  long-term  or  permanent  residence  and  temporary  employment.  Control  is  to  be
maintained via a number of administrative procedures and barriers, often duplicating each
other:
•  any foreign citizen arriving to Russia has to register within 3 days (place of
residence);
•  accommodation (residence) has to be found before registration, i.e. within 3 days;
•  temporary stay (upon authorized registration stamp) is limited to three months;
•  temporary residence (upon temporary residence permit) is possible within the
administrative area where the permit was issued;40
•  the number of permits for temporary residence in Russia for foreign citizen is
limited by a quota;
•  temporary residence permit holders and permanent residence permit holders must
re-register every year in a territorial unit of the Ministry of Interior;
•  employment for foreign citizens, temporary or permanently staying in Russia, is
possible only with a valid work permit;
•  recruitment of foreign employees is possible for licensed employees;
•  on entering the Russian Federation, at the border passport control, a foreign
citizen has to fill out a migrant card; the card is to be returned to a border guard
officer.
The law made no difference between ex-USSR citizens (except those who were born in
what is now the Russian Federation) and migrants coming to Russia from outside the post-
Soviet territory. Indignation in the society and especially among NGOs specializing in human
rights protection made the government introduce amendments to the Law in 2003 granting
some privileges to ex-USSR citizens for purposes of obtaining a temporary or permanent legal
status in Russia.
The 2002 Law introduced quotas for foreign workers from non-CIS states in Russia. For
2003, a quota of 530,000 invitations for foreign citizens to enter the Russian Federation was
approved.
22 The quota was broken down by provinces of Russia depending on the demand in
each such local labour market. However, the licensing procedure for employers recruiting
foreign workers was so time-consuming and complicated that the approved quota of 530,000
foreign workers was not fulfilled. Consequently, the quota for 2004 was reduced to 213,000
foreign workers
23. The mechanism of establishment of annual quotas was not transparent. In
fact, it was artificially narrowed the legal channels of labor migration because the actual
number of migrant workers employed in the Russian economy was at least twenty times higher
(Riazantsev 2007). It was a clumsy attempt to demonstrate protection of national labor market
while the actual reason for setting quotas was domination of the Russian politics by a
conservative wing.
                                                   
22 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation N: 782 of 30.10.2002 'On approval of quota for invitations
to foreign citizens to enter the Russian Federation for employment’ and Statement of the Ministry of Labor and
Social Development of the Russian Federation N; 238, Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation N: 1205,
Ministry of the Economic Development and Commerce N: 397 of 29.11.2002 ‘On distribution of the 2003 quota
for invitations to foreign citizens to enter the Russian Federation for employment by administrative units of the
Russian Federation.
23 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation N: 658 of 3.11.2003 'On approval of quota for invitations
to foreign citizens to enter the Russian Federation for employment’.41
9.4. Illegal migration as a reaction to tough legislation
The system proved inefficient. The red tape turned out to be unconquerable for most migrants
(registration delays, long lines, multiple visits to authorities, intentional delays, lack of reliable
information,  problems  with  finding  an  eligible  address  for  registration).  Although
unintentionally, the registration procedure actually became a powerful tool against the legal
immigration. Narrowing channels for legal migration provoked a growth of corruption in the
immigration industry (services issuing permits or certificates of registration unofficially,
authorities who take bribes from migrants without valid documents, etc.) (Tishkov et al. 2005).
Militia got the right to stop migrants in the streets and check their documents without any
reasons. Kickbacks from migrants have become an additional source of income for lower
militia staff (Grafova 2006b)
Surveys conducted by Russian researchers in the mid-2000s prove there are close links
between employment, illegality and registration. Half of employed migrants are registered but
only one in every five migrants is employed officially. A legal employment is typical of
registered migrants while unregistered migrants work without any written agreement with the
employer. One migrant in two is unable to legalize their employment because the registration
could not be obtained first. Two in three unregistered migrants are paid unofficially, while of
the registered migrants, 55% are paid officially (Tiuriukanova 2004a; Zaionchkovskaya 2007;
Soboleva and Chudaeva 2007; Zotova 2006).
Other results of the new approach include exploitation and forced labour distribution, the
most widespread practices being confiscation of documents and other types of bonding;
physical, psychological and other types of persuasion; abuse of power by officials; unpaid
labour (Tiuriukanova 2004b).
Thus, labor migration, suffering from red tape and corruption, ‘went underground’.
Instead of the expected decrease, the illegal migration was on the rise. No effective regulation
was at hand.
9.5. Illegal migration: assessment of the scale
It is commonly recognized that the volumes of irregular migration in Russia amount to
millions. However, the range of available estimates casts doubts on their reliability. When42
during the same week B. Gryzlov, the then Head of the Ministry of Interior responsible for
migration regulation, mentioned that there were 1.5 million of irregular migrants in the
country
24 while A. Chernenko, who was then Head of the Federal Migration Service acting
within the same Ministry declared that the number was over 6 million
25 it became evident that
even senior officials have little idea of the scale of to the problem with which they were trying
to cope (Ivakhnyuk 2004).
Resenting such blatant irresponsibility of estimations, journalists felt free to give their
own estimates of up to 15 million
26 irregular migrants, with over 3 million residing in the
Moscow region alone.
27
Even expert estimates differ greatly. For example, G. Vitkovskaya, coordinator of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Moscow Migration Research Program, gives
an estimate of 3 million (Vitkovskaya 2002). Zh. Zayonchkovskaya, head of the Migration
Research Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ (RAS) Institute of National-Economic
Forecasting—3–4 million (IOM 2001). Y. Krasinets, expert on irregular migration at the RAS
Institute for Socio-Economic Studies of Population—4–4.5 million (Krasinets et al. 2000, 82).
V. Mukomel, the Senior Researcher of migration in the RAS Institute of Sociology, estimates
total number of irregular migrants in Russia as 4.9 million (Mukomel 2005, 196). V. Ivanov,
head of the Presidential Committee on Migration Policy, said in 1999 that if no urgent
measures to counter irregular migration were taken, it would increase threefold by 2010, i.e. to
19 million. This forecast was repeatedly quoted by the media.
28
It seems reasonable to put aside extreme estimations provoked either by inaccuracy or
political machinations. In any case, assessment of the actual number of irregular migrants in
Russia is complicated by inadequate border & immigration control, the absence of an
integrated migration database, poor coordination between the border guards and the migration
services. Most often the methodology of estimates is not transparent.
Our assessment is based on categorization of the irregular migrant stock, numbers of
apprehensions and deportations of migrants, the shadow economy estimates, the flows of
money transfers by migrants, local surveys of migrant workers in different Russian provinces,
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26 Gazeta, 12 March 2003
27 Vremya MN, 12 December 2002
28 See, for example, Chuykin M. ‘Russia Is Becoming a Heaven for Illegal Migrants’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 5
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and  information  from  source  countries  (IOM  2004;  ADB  2007;  Maksakova  2002;
Nelegalnaya... 2002; Tiuriukanova 2004a; Riazantsev 2007; Sadovskaya 2007; Vitkovskaya
2002).
The biggest group of illegal migrants in Russia is citizens of the ex-USSR countries who
have come to the country looking for jobs and/or residence. Visa-free entrance rules based on
the bilateral agreements between the most of CIS countries allow them to cross the boundaries
legally. However, due to the bureaucratic obstacles on the way to Russian citizenship and legal
employment the overwhelming majority of migrants find themselves in an illegal status. They
are primarily employed in the informal sector of the economy. Many of them come for
seasonal work in construction, services and agriculture and stay in Russia for 7-9 months on
average (Tiuriukanova 2004a; Soboleva and Chudaeva 2007). During the high season (spring –
summer) their number reaches 3–4 million.
Besides, there are 2-3 million irregular migrants from CIS states who stay in Russia for a
few years. They work and live in Russia with their families, they do not visit their home
countries and they would probably like to get naturalize in Russia but the lack of required
documentation prevents them from going legal. They are usually closely tied to their ethnic
communities where they get unofficial protection and support.
Irregular migrants from non-CIS countries are mainly represented by transit migrants
from Asian and African countries on their way to the Western Europe where they intend to
apply for a refugee status or reunite with their relatives, but they sometimes stay in Russia for
months and years before progressing to the intended destination (the account for about 500,000
illegal migrants) (Nelegalnaya... 2002), and foreign citizens (mainly from Vietnam and Korea)
whose employment contract in Russia has terminated, or who have graduated from Russian
universities and professional schools (students from Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, Congo, Guinea,
and Ethiopia) and who would rather not return to their countries but stay in Russia (they are
about 100,000) (Krasinets et al. 2000; Vitkovskaya 2002).
Thus, the total number of irregular migrants in Russia can be estimated at 3–4 million;
this number rises to 5–7 million in spring and summer with the arrival of seasonal workers.
Concentration of irregular migrants by regions and industries generally corresponds to the
distribution of regular migrants. About one third of them stay in the Moscow region; other
regions of concentration are big cities like Saint-Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg,
Krasnodar region, and rapidly developing oil & gas producing regions – Khanty-Mansiiskiy
AO and Yamalo-Nenetskiy AO (IOM 2004). Like regular migrants, illegal migrants are44
employed primarily in construction, trade and services; one can see them in open markets and
on construction sites, sometimes employed for small-scale private housing projects (e.g.
building a cottage) (Riazantsev 2007).
9.6. The advantages and disadvantages of irregular migration
Once irregular migrants are in the country, their illegality creates a number of problems that
have human and economic costs for the individuals and the society. Their status allows their
employers to exploit them rather than employ them, and many businesses employing illegal
migrants operate in the grey economy, their activities being either illegal or not officially
registered, often linked to criminal activities. Immigrants often become victims themselves and
face many threats and problems, the safeguarding of their human rights and safety being a
challenge to the authorities (Tishkov et al. 2005). Their illegal situation in the country leads
most of them to accept the poor conditions of employment, way below the accepted standards
of labour in Russia. Employers can evade social taxes and violate the environment, sanitary
and labour safety norms.
Table 6 clearly shows that irregular migrants are more vulnerable in their relations with
employers than migrants of the regular status. However, even among regular migrants only
every third worker has an officially signed employment contract. Confiscation of the passport
by the employer is the most widespread practice to keep irregular migrants in a slavery-like
situation  when  the  worker  cannot  leave  the  employer  and  look  for  a  better  working
opportunity. Coercion to low-paid or unpaid work, physical and psychological pressure and
isolation are faced even by regular migrants; however, among irregular migrants this occurs 5-
6 timed more frequently. Every sixth irregular female migrant faces coercion to sex services.
Industries where exploitation of irregular migrants is most typical include entertainment and
housekeeping (ILO 2004, 66).45
Table 6. Situation of regular and irregular migrants in Russia







Proportion 10% 90% 100%
Average working week, hours 65 79 78
Availability of written job
contract
32% 7% 10%
Wages, USD per month 228 175 180
Passport is taken by employer 35% 67% 64%
Debt-bondage for employer 3% 10% 9%
Non-paid labor (partially) 7% 43% 39%
Non-paid labor (completely) 4% 23% 21%
Limitation of freedom 4% 40% 36%
Isolation 2% 31% 28%
Slavery situation 2% 12% 11%
Faced physical violence 1% 6% 5%
Faced psychological violence 10% 23% 22%
Forced for sex services (for
females)
1% 15% 14%
Source: The table is   from the article by M. Deliagin, the Head of the Institute for Global
Studies:  http://www.deliagin.ru/articles/2232.html . The data on irregular migrants is based on
the survey by Y. Tiuriukanova (ILO 2004, 66)
However,  poor  economic  conditions  in  their  own  countries  outweigh  the  harsh
employment terms in Russia for migrants from CIS states. Employment and earning in Russia
is an element of the survival strategy for a growing number of households in their countries of
origin. By mid-2000s, for 20 to 40% of households in smaller CIS countries – Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan – cash transfers by migrants have become an
important source of income (Zaionchkovskaya 2003; Moshnyaga 2007; Sadovskaya 2007;
Riazantsev 2007, Kireyev 2006).46
The illegal migrant-oriented services in Russia have developed over the recent decade
into a prosperous industry, often supported by militia officers (fake recruitment agencies,
businesses specialising in issuing false registration certificates, medical certificates, work
permits, migration cards) and expanding even further (Perepelkin and Stelmakh 2005).
Numerous migrant networks in Russia also support migration inflow and act as informal
promoters  of  their  compatriots  in  the  illegal  labor  market.  Creation  of  ‘ethnic  niches’
(Vorobyeva 2001a; Kamenski 2002, Ivakhnyuk 2008a) in the Russian labor market, where
Armenian migrants engage in road construction, Azeri migrants concentrate in the market
trade,  Moldavian  migrant  teams  specialize  in  apartments  renovation,  Kyrgyz  migrants
monopolize  cleaning  &  product  arrangement  in  supermarkets,  etc.,  facilitate  migrant
employment. Ethnic networks create a competition among illegal migrants from different
countries by reserving certain types of jobs for definite ethnic groups. In the periods of
economic crisis and a tightening labour market, this ethnic-based labor market monopolization
could spark social tension because the local workers are concerned about with dumping of
wages.
29
For these reasons the migrant inflow to Russia has been growing despite the lack of legal
opportunities and the desperate working conditions, and fuelling the illegal sector of economy.
About _ of migrant workers in Russia were employed in shadow economy in the early 2000s
(ILO 2003).
9.7. Public debate on migrants
The general policy of strengthening of power and establishment of order declared by Putin
administration resulted, among other things, in a real ‘war’ against irregular migrants (Grafova
2006a).   Mass apprehensions, penalization and deportations of migrants were followed by
xenophobic publications in media. Only in 2003, about 45,000 labor migrants working in
Russia without authorization were deported and over 1.5 million were fined (ILO 2003).
Xenophobia in the society was aggravated by the populist media comments and reports.
Calls for ‘stopping the hordes of uninvited settlers’ (D. Rogozin, the Rodina [Motherland]
Party leader)
30 and ‘not letting the immigrants feel masters (?) in the Russian land’ (V.Ilukhin,
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the KPRF [Communist Party of the Russian Federation] Secretary)
31 were absolutely typical of
the Russian nationalism-driven politics in the early 2000s.
Meanwhile, the voice of the liberal opposition was not heard. ‘We have no choice of
whether immigration to Russia will be taking place or not. The choice is whether it will be
regular, duly managed, with priorities given to Russians and Russian speaking migrants
willing to work, or it will be irregular, spontaneous, criminal, giving rise to corruption and
hatred of aliens’ (A. Chubais, co-leader of the SPS Party (Chubais 2003). ‘The type of the
future Russian society depends on how the Russian authorities and the Russian society will
design an effective immigration policy. The success of this policy is closely related to the
cultural openness of the society that would enable immigrants and their descendants to identify
themselves with the country of residence and become its integral part in the course of time...
The nowadays Russian migration policy has no future’ (Y. Gaidar, ex-Prime Minister of the
Russian Federation, co-leader of the SPS Party (Gaidar 2005, 466).
The public debate on migrants was over-loaded with pseudo-scientific arguments often
borrowed from western sources like additional pressure on social infrastructure of Russia.
Calculations of experts prove that this argument, which is true for European countries,
especially those where the social support of immigrants is a priority issue (e.g. Sweden), is
hardly applicable to Russia. Access to the social security system is regulated by a compulsory
medical insurance, a social pension insurance certificate, and so on. Even a pressure on
transportation system in cities and towns increases to a minor extent as irregular migrants do
not usually travel a lot (Perepelkin and Stelmakh 2005).
In analyzing the public debate on migrants and migration policy in Russia it is important
to understand that its influence of actual migration policy is very limited. The Russian political
system and decision making process is very different from western patterns. The Russian
migration policy is directly guided by the President (refer to section 9.2).  Even if the key
political parties express their attitudes towards migration trends (brain drain from Russia, out-
migration of Russian females who marry foreign males, excessive in-migration, especially
labor migration, etc.) these are usually no more than populist acts that have minimal influence
(or no influence at all) on decision making process.
A hundred years ago the Russian historian Vladimir Klyuchevsky argued that ‘in Russia
there has never been struggle of parties but rather struggle of bureaucracies’. This phrase
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gives the essential idea of the Russian political process. For this reason, reforms in Russia are
contradictory and chaotic; they reflect interests of various lobbying groups, but even those are
not clearly shaped, and the final decision is always made by the head of state.
9.8. Degradation of labour relationships
However,  professional  debate  on  foreign  labor  in  Russia  emphasized  the  increasing
degradation of the culture of labour relationships. This issue is related not only to the well-
known fact that migrants lower wages in the sectors where they concentrate (IOM 2001, 7-8).
In fact, relatively low prices for shadow migrant services, for example in construction and
apartment repair works, allow low-income Russian households to hire the migrants’ services
rather than contract official construction & repair companies. The worst thing is that labor
migrants from less prosperous ex-USSR states bring with them ‘non-civilized’ abominable
labor conditions to whole industries be it construction or transportation. In Russia these
industries have become marginal sphere of employment due to hard labor conditions (non-
heated worker’s locker rooms, lack of showers and hygienic rooms, hot meals, etc.) (ILO
2004). Russian laws on migration are no more than framework regulations that do not
guarantee wages, social and labor rights for migrant workers equal to national workers. They
are not detailed in guest-worker programs and schemes. Army of illegal migrant workers
discourages Russian employers to improve labor conditions and make their sites attractive for
national Russian workers (Riazantsev 2007).
In this context, illegal labor migration is resulting in worsened social standards in the
field of employment, damages fair competition and equal-rights principle but on the contrary,
develops unfair labor practices that are forbidden in developed countries and condemned by
the International Labor Organization.
10. The radical turn of 2006: a liberalization trend
10.1 Political call for reasonable migration policies
As already said above, the evolution of the Russian migration policy is closely related to the
personal stance of the President. The second Presidential term of Vladimir Putin was generally
more constructive, with a trend to liberalism. Political pragmatism called for elimination of49
most outrageous phenomena of dissociation between declared values and real policies. Apathy
of population during the 2003 (Duma) and 2004 (President) elections could not be unnoticed
by the higher political leadership. Radical changes in the State policy were needed to ‘shake
up’ the country. The corruption and despair in the field of migration were the areas where
ineffectiveness of the authorities was most blatant.
The wisest decision was to turn the situation pro domo sua, i.e. radically change the
vector of migration policy in order to benefit from it economically, demographically, and
politically. Such a decision needed political will and courage. Staff changes in the Presidential
Administration allowed the alarming forecasts of academics reach the closest Presidential
advisers.
In fact, there is a long list of reasons that stand behind the 2006 radical shift in the
Russian migration policy. It was initiated earlier, in March 2005. The President Putin speech at
the ad hoc meeting of the RF National Security Council on March 17, 2005 outlined new
Russian strategy towards immigrants and labor migrants that come to Russia in search for
employment. ‘There is a need to revise our migration strategy to make inflow of migrants our
benefit... For this purpose Russian migration policy is to be closely correlated with economic
and demographic development purposes of the country...  Today, out most important task is to
encourage migration inflow... The major reasons of irregular migration are much-talked-about
administrative barriers, which stand up against people who would like to stay and work in
Russia legally… Migrants are excluded from social security system… By lack of humane
attitude to millions of migrants we ourselves push them to the criminal sphere. Mess in
procedures  of  legalization  of  migrants  harms  interests  of  the  State,  the  society  and
economics.’
32
That was a sort of a signal of readiness of the State to perceive a new, more liberal,
approach to migration management, which was already outlined and insisted by academic
community, liberal politicians and NGOs.
10.2. Objective reasons for a revision of the migration policy
The new strategy was rooted in the following objective and subjective considerations:
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(1) Demographic forecast. Immigration has never been as important for the development
of Russia as it is expected to be in the coming decades. Demographers are unanimous in
forecasting a sharp population decline. Since 2006, Russia is losing its working population at
an increasing rate, expected to reach around 2010 over 1 million per year, amounting to a total
of about 18 million between 2006 and 2026. (The total labor force in Russia is 69 million in
2007.) The gravity of the situation is obvious. The decline of the working age population is
forecasted towards the middle of the century. Russia will need more than 25 million of
immigrants to compensate the labor force decline within the next 20 years. Thus, immigration
has become a strategic element of the Russian State policy (Ivakhnyuk 2008b).
(2) Economic considerations. An increased rate of Russia's economic growth, recovery
of industries, implementation of nation-wide economic projects, particularly in housing
construction, call for additional labour resources. In 2003, 40% of Russian enterprises faced a
labour deficit (Vishnevski 2006). Besides, an idea to curb the shadow sector by widening the
legal channels for employment was important. Given an opportunity for legal employment,
former irregular migrants and their employers ‘go out of shadow’; the shadow sector becomes
less attractive to labour migrants from other CIS countries as it was before, when they had no
alternative to undocumented employment.
(3) New understanding of national security. While irregular migration remains a major
national security concern in Russia, the understanding of national security has shifted from
being focused exclusively on the State to a wider approach incorporating economic, social,
demographic, cultural, ethnic, and human security of the nation. Correspondingly, the general
purpose of tackling irregular migration is pretended to be realized by combination of police
instruments (proper border management, exposure of human traffickers, immigration control,
secure identification documents, etc.) together with humane measures (regularization of
irregular migrants, development of legal channels for permanent and temporary migration as
an alternative for irregular migration and human trafficking).
(4) Social considerations. Xenophobia and intolerance towards migrants in the society
have brought about a risk of social outbursts. Sporadic ethnic-based conflicts in Russian cities
were inspired by nationalist organizations and populist slogans of political leaders
33.  In has
became apparent that the social climate, the regional development, the integrity of the country
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depends on how the State will cope with the issue of legalisation and attracting the sufficient
number of immigrants.
(5) Inefficiency of police suppression to reduce irregular migration. Police raids against
irregular migrants, inspections in enterprises aimed at finding illegally employed foreign
workers,  and  deportations  that  were  widely  practiced  since  2002  proved  their  low
effectiveness. Estimates of irregular migrants continued growing. Besides, more liberal
migration policy could be a blow on human traffickers who specialize on supplying Russian
employers with cheap labor. In 2004, Russia ratified the UN Convention against transnational
crime  and  its  Protocols  on  trafficking  in  human  beings  and  smuggling  of  migrants.
Correspondingly, in December 2004 the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was
supplemented with the Article 322 determining sentence to penalties up to prison punishment
for persons guilty in organizing human trafficking and smuggling. That was a shift in focus of
counter-irregular-migration policy from irregular migrants (who are often victims, in fact) to
organizers of irregular migration and human traffickers. Easier legalization procedures enable
migrant workers to seek for jobs via official migration infrastructure institutions not shadow
middlemen.
(6) Counteracting corruption. Over-bureaucratized procedures of getting residence and
work permissions gave rise to criminal migration infrastructure, often headed by migration
service officials, and developed shadow market of relevant services for migrants. Bribes-taking
from migrants and employers was an everyday practice and source of non-official income for
millions of militiamen.
(7) International  organizations,  academic  experts  and  NGOs made a lot to prove
ineffectiveness of the existing labor migration management model and inform Russian
authorities of the possible alternative models. Since 2005, experts from academia and NGOs
are permanent participants of different level meetings to discuss migration trends and policies.
(8) Re-orientation  of  migrant  flows. Since 2001 Kazakhstan has been a preferred
destination for Central Asian labor migrants. Competition for labor resources has already
become a reality of the globalizing world posing a risk for Russia to loose its appeal and the
migration potential.
(9) Geopolitical concerns. At the above ad hoc meeting of the RF National Security
Council on March 17, 2005 President Putin stressed that ‘the migration policy is also a strong
instrument to reinforce integration between the CIS countries... Legal employment and social
wellbeing of migrants coming from former Soviet states is one of factors to strengthen52
cooperation with our closest partners... For us, it is the most ‘natural’ way to replenish our
labor resources because these people are Russian speaking and they can be easily integrated in
Russian life.’
34 These statements were a response to call of the  governments of the source
countries to provide better employment conditions and security for their migrant-workers, on
the one hand, and desire of Russia to strengthen its leadership in the CIS, on the other hand.
Consequently, requested personally by the President Putin, the turn in Russian migration
policy was grounded on objective political, economic, and demographic reasons.
10.3. A pilot legalisation campaign
Revision of the Russian migration policy was realised in several directions simultaneously.
Initially, the pilot regularization of irregular labor migrants from the CIS states, which have
visa-free entry regime with the Russian Federation, was realized in 10 Russian provinces in
late 2005. The Concept was elaborated by the working group attached to the Expert Council of
the RF Human Rights Commissioner. As Russia has no experience in legalisation campaigns,
the experience of European countries and the United States in migrants’ amnesties was
carefully studied. The papers on different approaches to regularization of migrants written by
experts from these countries were published in detailed comparative studies. So, the Concept
issued from the experience of other countries in migrants’ amnesties as well as the experts’
estimates and results of sociological surveys of irregular migrants and employers that showed
that _ migrants and employers would prefer regular stay and legal work in case the appropriate
regulations are provided by the Russian legislation. The draft Concept was discussed at round
tables  with  participation  of  representatives  of  interested  government  bodies,  NGOs,
international organizations, experts from European countries that have experience in migration
amnesties.  In  mid-2005  the  Concept  was  approved  by  the  Tripartite  Commission  on
Regulation of Labor Relations (the Government, employers’ national associations, and trade
unions’ national associations) and the pilot regularization program was implemented in 10
regions of Russia
35 in November-December 2005.
The regularization procedure of the pilot project was utterly simplified: the ‘urgent
legalisation team’ comprising representatives of the Federal Migration Service, Federal
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Taxation Service, Federal Employment Service, and Ministry of Health arrived directly to the
enterprises, which voluntarily manifested their will to legalise the hired migrant workers and
within several days provided every migrant with a valid migrant card, a temporary residence
permit (for the term of labour contract), and a work permit. Totally, about 460 employers
participated in the pilot project; 7,400 irregular migrants were regularized (Zaionchkovskaya
2007). However, the results of the project were estimated as unsatisfactory due to the lack of
mechanisms to prevent re-illegalization of migrants; insufficient legal base, contradictions with
major migration laws, etc.
10.4. Policies regarding compatriots
Meanwhile, the purpose of dealing with an imminent demographic crisis in Russia and
consolidating the Russian community by encouraging its partial re-settlement to the territory of
the Russian Federation was reflected in the 2006-2012 State Programme on providing support
for voluntary re-settlement of compatriots to the Russian Federation (adopted by President
Decree of 22.06.2006).
The Programme is guided by the pragmatic purpose of the Russian Government to
alleviate the demographic crisis Russia is facing presently. At the same time, it has an
important humane potential as it provides compatriots
36 and their family members who would
like to move to Russia for permanent residence with State guaranties and social support
including:
-  a refund of travel expenses and transportation of their possessions;
-  guarantees of the State duty for the paper work to regularize their status at the territory of
the Russian Federation;
-  a one-off grant (travelling allowance);
-  a monthly allowance for the period until the Russian citizenship is obtained but not more
than for 6 months, in the absence of income from labour or business activities;
-  a  ‘compensation  packet’,  including  services  of  pre-school  institutions,  secondary
education, vocational training, social welfare, health care, and assistance in job seeking.
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The Programme is aimed not only to encourage compatriots to come and settle in Russia
but to distribute them over the territory of the Russian Federation giving preferences to those
migrants who move to the areas where economic and demographic situation requires an urgent
human  inflow  or  where  large-scale  investment  projects  requiring  labour  resources  are
underway.
The Program will be realized in 3 stages:
The first stage (2006): working out of legislation assigned to provide legal basement of
realization  of  the  Program;  assessment  of  demand  for  human  resources  by  the
administrative units (republics, provinces, and territories) of the Russian Federation;
information campaign.
The second stage (2007-2008): resettlement of the Program participants; integration of
compatriots; evaluation of the results; if necessary, modification of further regional
projects of immigration encouragement.
The third stage (2009-2012): further realization of resettlement regional projects; evaluation of
the results of the Program; if necessary, shaping of a new Program.
Roll-out of the Programme is managed by a special Inter-Departmental Commission
attached to the Government of the Russian Federation. Coordinator of the Program is the
Federal Migration Service. The Programme is under the direct patronage of the President of
the Russian Federation.
The Program is guided by the emerging idea of attracting people with some link to
Russia who for various reasons are living outside the country. It is thereby assumed that the
Program will be attracting people whose integration is likely to be the least problematic.  The
participants of the Programme are exempted from the strict regulations of obtaining Russian
citizenship as set by the 2002 Russian Federal Law on Citizenship (e.g. the required five-year
uninterrupted residence in Russia, a legal source of income and the knowledge of Russian
language
37).
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10.5. Policies regarding  migrants from CIS states
The focus of the 2006 migration policy reform was on generating more favorable conditions of
residence and employment in Russia for citizens of the CIS countries. Most importantly, two
principal laws on migration were adopted in 2006 and came into force on January 15, 2007:
•  the Federal Law No. 110-FZ of July 18, 2006 on Amendments to the 2002 Federal Law
on Legal Status of Foreign Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation, and
•  the Federal Law No. 109-FZ of July 18, 2006 on Registration of Foreign Citizen and
Apatrides in the Russian Federation.
The main objectives of the new laws were to simplify the procedure for recruiting a
foreign  citizen,  issuing  permits  for  temporary  residence/stay  and  for  registration.  The
amendments apply primarily to migrants from the CIS countries who come to Russia under a
visa-free regime. The new features include:
•  the term of permanent stay for foreign citizen was increased to 180 days (twice as
much as earlier),
•  the quota of permits for temporary residence to visa-free foreign citizen was cancelled;
•  a new procedure was introduced providing issuance of the Russian work permit
personally to the foreign citizen rather than to the employer while the employer can
hire any foreign citizen with a work permit.
•  a 10-day approval term for work permit applications by foreign citizens.
•  a  simplified  registration  procedure  at  the  current  address  (rather  than  earlier
requirement to register at the place of permanent residence) was introduced; but the
registration procedure at the place of residence is maintained with somewhat simpler
rules (the notion of a “host of the foreign citizen” was introduced, making a more
flexible link between the residence in Russia and actual accommodations).
Entry without a visa, a notification-based registration and a simplified work permit
procedures, as  well as the right to choose an employer ‘opened’ the Russian labour market for
citizens of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan,
and Ukraine
38.
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For 2007, Russia set a quota of 6 million work permits to foreign citizens from countries
that enjoy a visa-free regime with Russia.  The geographical distribution of work permits had
to be approved jointly by the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of Interior and local
representatives of the federal authorities. The government also imposed a quota of max. 40%
of foreign workers for jobs available, and starting from May 1, 2007 no migrants from the
countries with a visa-free regime with Russia are allowed to work in retail sale of alcoholic
beverages, pharmaceuticals, or in the markets within the Russian Federation. This was a
natural result of a hidden political struggle around the liberalization of migration-related
regulations. A compromise in line with the principle ‘to win the bigger, sacrifice the smaller’
was reached.
According to the new laws the process of hiring CIS citizen became simpler for both
employee and employer. The new procedure offered significant liberalization of the rules of
temporary employment for people the CIS countries enjoying visa-free agreements with
Russia. People from these countries could finally receive a work permit without a prior
recommendation or job offer from a Russian employer. The procedure can legally take ten
days only. The number of requested documents has been reduced: an identity document, an
immigration card, a receipt of the state fee (30 EUR) and HIV test results. A one-year work
permit allows its holder to change employers during his/her stay in Russia within the
boundaries of an administrative unit (province) where it was issued. The stay can also be
prolonged for another year.
Most importantly, the new migration policy in Russia is more humane than anything
before. Driven by a growing understanding of the futility and irrationality of the existing
situation where millions of people staying in Russia have no legal status and are deprived of
social security and legal protection, while corruption and crime are flourishing, the new
migration policy is increasingly in the interests of migrants from ex-Soviet countries and
encourages them to come to Russia regularly, making the process of migration to Russia
easier, more transparent, with a choice of legal opportunities for living and working in Russia.
Respect for the migrants’ rights is a significant feature of the new approach, as it  confirms the
legally guarantied freedom of movement across the territory of Russia and grants the migrant
access to (and protection of) his/her personal data in the Migration Databank
39.
                                                   
39 Article 6 of the Federal Law on Amendments to the Federal Law on Legal status of foreign citizens in the
Russian Federation (to be put in force on 15.01.2007).57
The  Federal  Migration  Service  with  its  new  migration  policy  acknowledges  its
responsibility for migrants coming to Russia. The then Deputy Director of the Federal
Migration Service Vyacheslav Postavnin said in his interview: “Introducing the new laws we
are saying to migrants from the CIS states: ‘Come openly, work legally, pay taxes and comply
with the Russian laws and enjoy equal rights with the Russian citizens’. We expect economic
benefits  from  their  presence  in  Russia.  On  our  part,  we  guarantee  them  respect  and
protection”
40.  The  Deputy  Minister  of  Interior  Alexander  Chekalin  highlights  the  anti-
corruption potential of the new legislation: “Migration bureaucrats were repeatedly blamed
for despotism and corruption. The new regulations are aimed at improving the situation. Now
we relieve migrants of the onerous need to personally contact the officers responsible for
making  decisions.  By  introducing  the  State  Migration  Registration  System  based  on  a
generalized Migration Database, we take migrant inflows under our control to be processed in
a new and more effective  way”
41.
Vladimir Lukin, the Human Rights Commissioner of the Russian Federation, argues that
“The turn in the migration policy of the Russian Federation towards liberalization and
humanization looks very promising. Though with a delay, the State is trying to introduce order
and rationality in the migration management. It is very important to promote this trend, to
ensure people’s awareness of the new initiatives, to explain to them the strategic goals of the
State, to win their support. The ethnic structure of the Russian society is transforming. This
requires a particular attention from the State: programmes of migrant integration, teaching
tolerance to the society must be part of the migration policy… Besides, the result of the new
policy strongly depends on how it will be implemented.”
42
10.6. The new legislation:  implementation results
During 2007, over 1.2 million work permits were issued to migrant workers from the CIS
countries which was twice as much as in 2006 and three times as much as in 2005. Figure 2
illustrates the dynamics of foreign labor inflow to Russia (in accordance with the annual
numbers of issued work permits) while Table 7 shows information about migrant workers by
countries of origin for the 2000s.
                                                   
40 From an interview by the author with Vyacheslav Postavnin on 18.07.2006.
41 http://www.vremya.ru/news/1012366.shtml.
42 From an interview by the author with Vladimir Lukin on 22.07.2006.58
Figure 2.Foreign Labor Force in Russia, 1994-2008, thousands
(as to numbers of issued work permits)
Sources: Population and migration in the Russian Federation. Statistical Yearbook. Moscow:
Rosstat; Monitoring of regular international labor migration in Russia in 2005-2006. Moscow:
Federal Migration Service, 2007; Monitoring of regular international labor migration in Russia
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Table 7. Foreign Labor Force in Russia, 2000-2008
(numbers of issued work permits)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008*
Total 213.3 283.7 359.5 377.9 460.4 702.5 1,014.0 1,717.1 2,157.0
including:
from CIS
states: 106.4 148.6 204.6 186.5 221.2 343.7 537.7 1,152.8 1,596.0
Azerbaijan 3.3 4.4 15.0 6.0 9.8 17.3 28.3 57.6 69.6
Armenia 5.5 8.5 12.6 10.0 17.0 26.2 39.8 73.4 95.8
Georgia 5.2 4.9 6.8 3.2 3.8 4.3 4.9 4.7 3.8
Kazakhstan 2.9 3.6 7.6 4.0 4.2 4.1 4.9 7.6 8.6
Kyrgyzstan 0.9 1.7 6.4 4.8 8.0 16.2 33.0 109.6 160.2
Moldova 11.9 13.3 40.7 21.5 22.7 30.6 51.0 93.7 117.3
Tajikistan 6.2 10.0 16.8 13.6 23.3 52.6 98.7 250.2 347.5
Turkmenistan 0.2 0.1 7.0 0.2 0.3 1.5 0.7 2.1 2.8
Uzbekistan 6.1 10.1 15.5 14.6 24.1 49.0 105.1 344.6 563.2
Ukraine 64.1 91.9 61.0 102.6 108.6 141.8 171.3 209.3 227.1
from non-CIS
states: 106.9 135.1 154.9 197.4 238.5 358.8 476.3 563.8 560.4
China 26.2 38.6 38.7 72.8 94.1 160.6 210.8 228.8 241.0
North
Korea 8.7 9.9 12.7 13.2 14.7 20.1 27.7 32.6 31.7
Vietnam 13.3 20.1 26.7 35.2 41.8 55.6 69.1 79.8 76.1
Turkey 17.8 20.9 15.4 37.9 48.0 73.7 101.4 131.2 121.1
* Data for January-September 2008
Sources: Population and migration in the Russian Federation. Statistical Yearbook. Moscow:
Rosstat; Monitoring of regular international labor migration in Russia in 2005-2006. Moscow:
Federal Migration Service, 2007; Monitoring of regular international labor migration in Russia
in 2006-2007. Moscow: Federal Migration Service, 2008. [all sources in Russian].60
However, in reality the new regulations turned to be less liberal than they seemed. By the
mid-2008 it became clear that the new rules so much welcomed by migrants clashed against
the unreasonably small foreign workers quotas (1.3 million for 2008 against 6 million for
2007) and a legalization procedure that started in 2007 had an unexpected turn. With no
reliable methods for calculating the demand of foreign labor, the quotas became a stumbling
block for the new liberal model of labor migration management. Quotas for 2008 were
established on the basis of the total amount of requests from employers. However, the first
requests were collected as early as mid-2007 when many employers had not known about the
quotas for CIS migrant workers.  Besides, there are no effective interaction schemes for
different state authorities, no programmes of collection and submission of data required to fix
and harmonise the quotas.
An income tax rate of 30% for foreign workers compared to the 13% tax rate for local
workers
43 forces labor migrants to agree on the unofficial labor relations with their employers
and conceal their true incomes from taxation. A poor labor migration infrastructure (a lack of
information resources about vacancies, legal advice, eligible recruitment agencies, etc.) also
contributes to the low effectiveness of the ‘free migrant labor market’ model (Ivakhnyuk
2008c).
10.7. Assessment of the new migration legislation by migrants and employers
The  new  regulations  assessed  by  migrants  and  employers  are  shown  in  Figure  3.  The
monitoring of implementation practices of the new migration legislation in Russia, which is
the basis of this data, was conducted in September 2007 in several provinces of the Russian
Federation, i.e. only half a year after the new laws were put into force. It is clear that at this
early stage shortcomings could seem more obvious than benefits because the new procedures
hardly had any trial period, and there was the lack of experience, queues in migration service
offices, etc. However, this data already allows for certain conclusions.
The fact that 2/3 of employers agree that the situation in the labor migration management
has improved is optimistic. However, one should not forget that the employers who were
                                                   
43 According to the Russian Tax Code, a 30% income tax is applied to all foreign citizens employed in the
Russian Federation during the first 6 months of their work in Russia.61
interviewed do hire foreign workers legally. For them, the fact that they don’t have to get
permissions to hire migrant workers from the CIS and apply for work permissions on their
behalf is a definite advantage of the reform. It corresponds with the argument of M. Moskvina,
Director of the Labor Relations and Labor Market Department of the Russian Union of
Entrepreneurs and Employers (RUEE): “There should be no procedural difference for Russian
employers for hiring local or foreign labour force. Most importantly, they are to be supplied
with labor resources needed for a systematic production process”.
44  It  is  unlikely  that
employers who hire migrant workers illegally were covered by the poll, so the monitoring
results cannot apply to all Russian employers.
As for migrants, the results of monitoring seemingly demonstrate their low knowledge
about the reform. The fact that one third of both migrants and employers do not know whether
the new regulations have made the situation better or worse proves that either the information
about the new rules is inadequate, that there are obstacles on the path of the easy-to-follow
idea of new rules. The fact that every fifth migrant argues that the situation has not changed is
even  more  surprising.  Nevertheless,  interviews  with  migrants  show  that  when  legally
employed, they have an easier access to the healthcare system and vocational training, and this
fact only makes them embrace wholeheartedly the new facilitated regulation (Vitkovskaya and
Platonova 2008).
We may, therefore, conclude that the reform was not very well prepared, or properly
promoted, and it should have been followed by an educating campaign. The benefits of a
simplified legalization and employment procedure in Russia were overshadowed by the flaws
in realization of the new regulations, at least at the initial stage.
                                                   
44 Speech of M. Moskvina at the theoretical and practical conference “Practice of foreign labor force attraction
and use in Russia: trends, mechanisms, and instruments’, Moscow, Russian Academy of Sciences, 16-17 October
2006.62
Figure 3. Assessment of the new migration legislation, September 2007
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Source: Vitkovskaya G., Platonova A. (eds.) (2008) Novoie migratsionnoye zakonodatelstvo v
Rossii:  pravoprimenitelnaya  praktika (po resultatam  proekta  MOM/OBSE/FMS  RF
‘Monitoring praktiki realizatsii novogo migratsionnogo zakonodatelstva rossii v sub’ektakh
RF’  [New  Migration  Legislation  in  Russia:  Implementation  Practices  (Results  of  the
IOM/OSCE/FMS RF Project ‘Monitoring of Implementation Practices of the New Migration
Legislation in Russia in its Regions] (Moscow: IOM Mission in Russia) [in Russian].
10.8. Public debate on migration reform
The idea to liberalize the laws on residence and work in Russia has provoked a sharp
discussion in the society, among political parties, and in the media. It has become an apple of
discord, an uncompromising delimitation between conservative and liberal politicians
45. Even
within the Federal Migration Service and other governmental institutions involved in migration
management there is no unanimous opinion on the reasons and timeliness of liberalization of
migration legislation. Traditions of a closed country are persistent while the regulation models
of market economy have not settled down yet. A turn in the official migration strategy towards
human-oriented regulations and transparent procedures is not an easy process. A survey among
migration service officers in summer of 2006 when the new laws had already been approved
                                                   
45 Thus, anti-migrants position has already cost representation in the Moscow City Duma (the City Parliament) to
the ‘Rodina’ (‘Motherland’) political party.63
but not yet put in force showed that almost 40% of the staff responsible for implementation of
the migration policy did not support the new rules and insisted on the former permissive
employer-driven procedure of foreign workers legalization (Zaionchkovskaya 2007).
The public opinion has mixed views of the new policy, and regulators treat it as a source
of crime and capital export. The media often worsen the situation, and fail to show any
positive aspects of labor immigration, when in fact many Russian enterprises have managed to
escape bankruptcy, and a significant part of the Russian population managed to escape
poverty, because of labor immigration, and small businesses could hardly survive without
labor migrants, let alone the fact that these are ready to take up jobs that the locals would not
even consider taking.
Generally, the public opinion reacted with a ‘passive negativism’. This shows that, on the
one hand, there was no information and explaining campaign before the reform and, on the
other hand, there were no appropriate public debate before the reform that could ensure better
understanding of the role of migration in the contemporary development of Russia, if not the
public consent of the subject.
The continuous political debate in the society on migration issues is fuelled by the global
economic crisis, which has already hit the migrant-loaded construction industry. A recent
study in Moscow commissioned by the Public Chamber
46 showed that ‘the majority of
Muscovites are ready to take jobs currently held by gastarbeiters … providing they are well
paid’. Other experts argue that migrants, if laid off, will not turn to criminal activities as
populists and journalists fear but will move to other employment niches being more flexible
than locals; for example, they may switch from construction to commerce and services
47 (also
refer to section 11).
10.9. Position of source countries
The ‘open door’ policy is appreciated by migrants and governments of CIS countries. For
them, bigger opportunities to work in Russia mean a larger volume of migrants’ remittances
(table 8). The legal channels for money transfers have notably increased since 2005 when
estimates of money transferred from Russia to source countries were made public and attracted
                                                   
46 ttp://www.oprf.ru/structure/comissions2008/108/news/3052
47Interview of V. Mukomel, Head of Department of Xenophobia in the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of
Sciences. Available at: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/poehali/557038-echo/64
attention of business that reacted by starting of a variety of banking and non-banking
institutions specially designed to offer services to migrants. Legal and illegal migrants have
equal access to these services; however, as it is proved for other countries, when duly
legalized, migrants are more likely to use the official channels of remittances (Ratha 2003).
Table 8. Remittances inflow and outflow in the post-Soviet states, 2000-2007, million USD
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007*
Inflow to:
Azerbaijan 57 104 181 171 227 693 812 993
Armenia 87 94 131 686 813 940 1175 1273
Belarus 139 149 141 222 256 370 334 334
Georgia 274 181 231 235 303 346 485 533
Kazakhstan 122 171 205 147 165 178 188 188
Kyrgyzstan 9 11 37 78 189 322 739 739
Moldova 179 243 324 487 705 920 1182 1200
Russia 1275 1403 1359 1453 2495 2918 3091 4000
Tajikistan … … 79 146 252 466 1019 1250
Turkmenistan … … … … … … … …
Uzbekistan … … … … … … … 1400**
Ukraine 33 141 209 330 411 595 829 944
Outflow from:
Russia 1409 1101 1823 2226 3233 5188 6989 11438
Kazakhstan 356 440 487 594 802 1354 2000 3037
* Estimate of the World Bank.
** Estimate of experts of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) (Ehe EurAsEC Economic
Review, 2007, N:3, p. 50)
Sources: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, August 2007; World Bank, World Development
Indicators Database, April 2008.
The role of migrant remittances for origin countries in the CIS region at macro level is
illustrated in table 9. In many cases the migrants’ money transfers exceed in volume foreign65
direct investments ((FDI) and official development aid (ODA), and play a major role in the
balance of payment statistics.















Azerbaijan 812 - 584 206 13,862
Armenia 1,175 543 213 1,408
Georgia 485 1,060 361 2,554
Kyrgyzstan 739 182 311 1,099
Moldova 1,182 242 228 1,546
Tajikistan 1,019 339 240 646
Uzbekistan … 164 149 6,528
in per cent of GDP
Azerbaijan 6.0 -2.9 1.1 70
Armenia 18.3 8.5 3.3 22
Georgia 6.4 13.8 4.7 33
Kyrgyzstan 27.8 6.5 11.1 39
Moldova 36.2 7.3 6.9 46
Tajikistan 36.2 12.0 8.6 23
Uzbekistan … 1.0 0.9 38
* IMF data
** World Bank data
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics, August 2007; World Bank, World Development
Indicators Database, April 2008.66
10.10. Labor migration effect on opportunities for migrants’ human development
Even more importantly, migrants’ money transfers help reduce poverty, improve incomes of
population, consumption and health standards and provide an alternative source of social
security when the State resources for social support of the population are extremely limited. A
survey of CIS migrants employed in Russia was conducted by Yelena Tiuriukanova in 2004
and it gives her reasons to conclude that ‘without exaggeration we can argue that migrants’
remittances definitely re-shape the social structure in source countries by prompting the
growth of the middle class and reducing the poor and extremely poor layers’ (Tiuriukanova
2005).
 As for interviews with migrants, the majority of them indicate ‘very bad’ (every fourth
respondent) and ‘bad’ (every second respondent) economic conditions in their homeland prior
to migration. The analysis of subjective estimates by migrants of their own welfare before and
after the migration proves that migration has helped a majority of migrants to improve their
living standards and shift them from a low-income group to a higher-income group. As a
result, a number of people in a ‘very bad’ and ‘bad’ economic situation has reduced more than
twice while the group with a situation described as ‘average’ has increased significantly
(Figure 4).
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Source: Tiuriukanova Y. (2005) Denezhniye perevodi migrantov: beda ili blago? [Migrant
Remittances: a Disaster or a Benefit?]
http://www.polit.ru/research/2005/11/30/demoscope223_print.html
Amounts  of  money  transfers  sent  monthly  by  CIS  migrants  from  Russia  to  their
homelands generally correspond to the average global IMF estimate of USD 100 per month.
For example, migrants from Moldova who work in Moscow, send home USD 114 per month,
or USD 1,368 per year on average (Tiuriukanova 2005). For migrants from Azerbaijan the
respective figures are USD 107 and USD 1,284 (ibid.). Migrants from Kyrgyzstan who have a
permanent job in Russia, send USD 2,065 per year while seasonal workers scrape up USD
1,419. Tajik migrants send home USD 1,187 on average, including males – USD 1,203,
females – USD 950 (ADB 2007, 38). Households in Armenia receive from their family
members who work in Russia USD 1,890 per year; from those who work in other countries
USD 2,117 (Roberts, Banaian 2004).
All sociological surveys of migrant households without exception conclude that the
overwhelming part of migrants’ money transferred home is expended by households on
essential goods: food, clothes, medicine, etc. Even this role of migrant remittances is important
for the context of human development as increased quality and quantity of food, access to paid
healthcare facilities and opportunity to put children into school improve the living standards of
migrant families. An increase in everyday consumption stimulates production of consumer
goods and pushes an economy ahead. Moreover, a growing volume of money transfers creates
new ways to use them, including buying land and real property, investments in human capital,
founding one’s own business and development of the local infrastructure (Ratha 2003).
A survey of migrant households in Moldova in 2006 showed that up to 80% of the
households which had reported a family member working abroad had also reported an increase
in their income; almost half of the migrant households had got better access to education and
health services (Figure 5).68
Figure 5. Human Development Changes in the Households with One Family Member
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Source: Remittances and Migration in the Republic of Moldova, 2006. Working paper.
UNICEF-Moldova (Information provided by Lina Botnaru, UNICEF-Moldova)
However, the same survey in Moldova showed that despite a significant improvement in
the households’ financial situation, labor migration has its negative psychological costs, e.g. in
terms of   bad effects it has on children because their parents are away. For example, the
absence of parents has had a detrimental impact on the children’s morale and academic success
particularly if the person who migrated was the mother, as mothers tend to help children more
with their homework. Children with migrant parents have exhibited higher risk such as
exposure to drug abuse or dropping out of school or precocious sexual relationships.
Children who migrate with their parents also face difficulties, e.g. in terms of access to
education  and  adaptation  among  peers.  Poor  knowledge  of  the  Russian  language  and
differences in school curricula in the countries of destination and origin prompt psychological
and educational tensions. The poor performance at school reduces further access to university
education (Tiuriukanova nad Ledeneva 2005).
Changes in the social status of migrants before and after movement to the country of
destination seriously affect their development opportunities and especially the prospects of
their children. A 2004 survey of immigrants to Russia showed that for 33% of respondents69
their social status had not changed in comparison with the pre-migration situation; 28% stated
that their social status had increased, i.e. the migration had resulted in upwards social mobility
for them; 39% indicated a lowered social status resulting from the migration to Russia (ibid).
The lowered social status directly influenced expectations of their children. In the first two
groups, 70.5% and 66.6% of the children respectively are planning to enter universities while
in the third group only half of secondary school graduates tend to enter university.
Importantly, the realization of education-related ambitions is one of the strongest stimuli
for migration. For 38% of immigrants in Moscow, the intention to educate children in Russian
was one of reasons to move to Russia ((Tiuriukanova nad Ledeneva 2005).
10.11. Investment potential of money transfers
There is evidence from origin countries in the post-Soviet territory that a certain part of
migrant households tend to use the income from labor migration as a start-up capital for small-
scale businesses while the experience and the ‘market skills’ of migrants got from overseas
employment reinforces their business activity. In Ukraine, 60% of migrant households, in
which family members are engaged in business activity in Ukraine, have got their initial
capital from cross border circular trips or temporary labor migration. If a family business has
existed before labor migration of a family member, the wages transferred are used for business
expansion (Pirojkov et al. 2003, 125). Experts in Georgia also point out ‘a growth trend in
expenditure of migrants’ money transfers for purposes of small-scale business’ (Tukhashvili
2007, 124).
Non-migrant households also (indirectly) benefit from the inflow of migrants’ money
transfers to their country via the multiplier effect of growing incomes and employment. The
housing construction started by migrant families creates jobs for local workers and encourages
demand for locally produced construction materials. Surveys in Uzbekistan prove that every
fifth or sixth local entrepreneur has got their start-up capital as a result of international
migration, and each of them creates from 20 to 30 jobs for local workers in average. A survey
of 111 companies owned by former labor migrants that was conducted in Uzbekistan in 2001
showed that in total, these companies had provided 3,700 job places, i.e. 33 per one company
(Maksakova 2002, 21).70
The above considerations explain why a liberal model of labor migration management in
Russia is especially appreciated by source countries. Planned in accordance with the Russian
economic and demographic interests, the new Russian migration legislation also plays a
positive  role  for  migrants  who  come  to  Russia  in  search  of  employment  or  long-term
residence.
11. The global economic crisis input in the migration policy debate
The global economic crisis that started in 2008 influences the public debate on migration in
many countries, including Russia. A slowdown in economic growth, a decline in demand,
including the demand for labor, challenges the expediency of migrant labor when wage
expectations of local workers go down. In Russia, labor migrants were the first target of
populist politicians in the early autumn of 2008 when the effect of the global crisis started to
show in Russia and resulted in growing numbers of unemployed Russian citizens. The papers
published alarmist articles on possibilities of criminalization of millions of gastarbeiters who
are likely to lose their work on construction sites in the wake of the economic crisis.
48 The
Movement Against Illegal Immigration headed by Alexander Belov enhanced its protest
actions against migrants encouraging ethnic-based conflicts between Russians and migrants
from Central Asia
49.
However, the Ministry of Interior statistics does not register an upsurge in crime among
migrants. In 2008, less than 3% of all crimes in Russia were committed by migrants from the
CIS states
50 and there is a very slow growth in comparison with 2007.
The outflow of regular and irregular migrants in September-December 2008 was close to
1 million; however, it is a ‘normal’ seasonal decrease in numbers of foreign workers in
Russia.
51 Meanwhile, the Director of the FMS K. Romodanovsky is concerned that the
negative attitudes of Russian citizens towards migrants inspired by the media can provoke
conflicts and destabilize the situation in the streets. To avoid this, the FMS is planning to re-
                                                   




distribute labor migrants over the territory of the Russian Federation to find jobs for them in
labor-deficit provinces and not to push migrants into illegality or deport home.
52
Besides, on December 8, 2008 the Prime-Minister V. Putin declared that it would be
reasonable to reduce the quota by half to 3.9 million foreign workers that had been earlier
projected for 2009
53. From then on, the Ministry for Healthcare and Social Development is
empowered to revise the annual quota for foreign workers in accordance with changes in the
economic situation and labor market demands.
Russian academic experts are unanimous in understanding that the segmented Russian
labor market will require migrant workers even under a growing ‘internal’ unemployment.
54
Sooner or later, the crisis will end but the need of the Russian economy for migrant labor will
stay on due to the objective shifts in the structure of the Russian population, first of all, ageing
and an absolute decrease in the working age population. The idea of a cooperation between
Russia and the CIS countries for development of a common labor migration infrastructure and
a pre-departure vocational training of migrants in their countries of origin is gaining additional
stimuli.
55 Source countries are ready to cooperate in order to avoid a mass return of labor
migrants  to  their  countries  where  labor  market  cannot  absorb  them.  In  Ukraine,
parliamentarians are concerned about possible social outburst on the side of returned labor
migrants while the Ministry of Interior of Ukraine estimates the possible number of returning
migrants is 3 million and warns about potential aggravation of crime.
56 In Kyrgyzstan, the
State Committee on Migration and Employment is launching a vocational training of potential
migrants in professional schools and expresses hopes that the economic crisis will not
significantly decrease the demand for skilled workers in Russia where there is a stable deficit
of skilled factory workers.
57
                                                   
52 Interview of K. Romodanovsky to the INTERFAX News Agency on 13.01.2009.
http://www.fms.gov.ru/press/publications/news_detail.php?ID=26698
53 http://www.kreml.org/news/199356734
54 Interview of V. Mukomel, Head of Department of Xenophobia in the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy
of Sciences. Available at: http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/poehali/557038-echo/; Speech of Zh. Zaionchkovskaya at
the meeting of the Public Council of the Federal Migration Service on ‘International Labor Migration Management
under the Circumstances of Economic Crisis’ on 28.11.2008
55 Interview of Ekaterina Egorova, Deputy-Director of the Federal Migration Service to Rossiiskaya Gazeta on
30.10.2008.
56 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8.12.2008
57 Ibid.72
12. Xenophobia calls for an integration policy and tolerance programmes
The intolerance of migrants and xenophobia are a permanent background for the migration
policy in the post-Soviet Russia. It is significant that before the USSR collapsed people who
were facing an inflow of migrants, including ethnically different persons from other Soviet
republics, to their cities/towns/villages/communities did not link their positive or negative
attitudes towards newcomers with their ethnicity. According to a 1990 survey of the VCIOM –
All-Union Center for Public Opinion Studies, for 52% of respondents the ethnic background of
migrants who arrived to their area did not matter at all; 30% said that they are ‘against
migrants of any nationality’; 18% said that they would ‘prefer immigrants of their own ethnic
group to come’(cited from: Mukomel 2005, 67-68) .
In the late 1990s when the inflow of permanent and temporary migrants from the
Caucasus and Central Asia became well-shaped, with the social and economic situation in
Russia remaining unstable, the attitudes towards migrants became distinctly ethnically biased.
The slogans of nationalistic parties and political movements like ‘Russia for Russians!’ were
embraced mainly by youth and degrading elderly citizens (Leonova 2004, 86). According to
the Levada Sociological Monitoring Center in 2004, 60% of respondents would negatively
assess the arrival of labor migrants from the Caucasus, Central Asia or China to their
communities while 30% would take this fact indifferently. As for migrants from Ukraine and
Moldova, the share of positive and indifferent responses was over 70%.
58
Nowadays, the authorities, politicians, and the media highlight mainly negative aspects
of migration to Russia making special stress on the formation of ‘new diasporas’ (this trend is
analyzed  in  detail  in:  Diatlov  2003;  Grafova  2006a;  Petrov  2004;  Mukomel  2005).
Exaggeration of how important the migrants’ ethnicity is results in xenophobia and attitudes to
migrants as aliens. The antipathy towards migrants is typical for 68% of Russian citizens (Pain
2004, 233).
The anti-immigrant public mood does have grounds: among migrants there are criminals,
drug pushers, and socially dangerous persons. Some migrant communities are closed; they
follow their own cultural norms and values that are different from the local traditions. Self-
exclusion of migrants is often a response to the hostility of local communities (Drobizheva
2003, 76). However, the arguments of xenophobes are mainly focused on economic reasons:
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35% of Russian citizens questioned by the Levada Sociological Monitoring Center in 2005
argue that ‘migrants take jobs that could be taken by local workers’; 31% insist that migrants
contribute to an upsurge in criminal activity; 23% say that migrants do not pay taxes and
facilitate the outflow of capital; 22% are concerned that migrants dump wages of local workers
(cited from: Mukomel 2005,70-71). Surprisingly, respondents do not even mention threat of
terrorism in the context of their negative attitudes to migrants.
These concerns, even unconfirmed by research and analysis, offer fertile ground to
exaggeration of the negative aspects of immigration in the society and political games that
promise election success and other political dividends. Besides, they explain the disposition of
the Russian population towards a tough immigration policy.
The radical shift in the Russian migration policy towards an ‘open door’ policy in 2006,
well-grounded in terms of the demographic and economic rationales, was – to a certain extent
– contradicting the dominating public opinion on the much desired limitation of the immigrant
inflow. Instead, the registration and employment-regulating procedures for CIS citizens were
facilitated. As already said above, the decision of President Putin on the necessity of a cardinal
revision of the Russian migration policy was announced at the meeting of the RF National
Security Council in March 2005, a year after he was elected for the second presidential term.
With a consolidated power, President Putin embarked on a necessary but unpopular step.
The ‘Kondopoga incident’ in September 2006 when a brawl between ethnic Russians and
Caucasian 'newcomers' threatened a continued mass unrest and made the local Russian
authorities deploy the regional OMON (Special-Purpose Police Units) to prevent large-scale
pogroms,
59 revealed the ethnicity-related tension in the society. The local event in the tiny
town of Kondopoga, near Petrozadvodsk, in the Republic of Karelia in the Russia’s North-
Western Federal District, echoed with serious interethnic clashes over Russia, involving
extremist organizations.  Viktor Masliakov, the mayor of Petrozavodsk declared that ‘some
people  try  to  make  Petrozavodsk  an  example  for  the  whole  of  Russia.’
60   This  event
demonstrated that the authorities are likely to underestimate the actual and potential challenges
posed by the adoption of a large scale immigration policy. Indeed, it was not so much the
deaths the conflict caused, but the fact that it was a social unrest that, in combination with a
rise of extremist organizations, creates a very dangerous example for cities throughout Russia
that have similar interethnic complications but larger populations (Herd and Sargsyan, 2007).
                                                   
59 RIA Novosti, 03 September 2006, at:  http://www.rian.ru/incidents/crime/20060903/53447134.html
60 Fontanka.ru, 6 September 2006, at: http://www.fontanka.ru/2006/09/06/173951/74
Since  then  the  activities  of  the  Government  aimed  at  preventing  xenophobia  and
extremism and teaching tolerance towards immigrants have gained an extra stimulus. The
Federal Tolerance Development Programme designed by the Government and implemented
from 2001
61  is currently detailed in the regional tolerance development programmes in all
provinces of the Russian Federation.
62 Special attention to preventing xenophobia is paid in
Moscow where immigrants and labor migrants concentrate. The tolerance development
programme ‘Capital of the Multiethnic State’ for 2008-2010 is launched.
63 Realization of these
programmes is correlated with the activities of human rights NGOs and diasporas. The
programmes are incorporated in secondary and professional schools’ programmes. The very
first lesson in secondary schools all over Russia on September 1, 2008 was the Lesson of
Tolerance.  More widely, the tolerance programmes are addressed to the society and relate to
the integration of migrants’ programmes that have been traditionally an underestimated
element of the Russian migration policy.
13. Final remarks
Evaluation of effectiveness of migration policy in Russia and other post-Soviet states, on the
one hand, and ‘old democracies’ on the other hand, is fundamentally different. Inherited from
the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods, the idea of a strong State able to manage sensibly any
process (economic, demographic, social, or political) is producing attitudes to   migration
policy as an instrument to secure the State interests. Correspondingly, a migration policy is
effective when the interests of the State are provided for. It worked during the Soviet regime
when the State was manipulating people in their spatial movements. It was likely to work in
the post-Soviet era too, especially under President Putin who made a particular emphasis on
strengthening the ‘line of command’.  In terms of internal migration, an effective migration
policy should reverse migration flows back to depopulated areas in the Far East and the North,
and provide higher mobility of population much required in a market economy. In terms of
international migration, an effective migration policy should bar illegal immigration, provide
the  country  with  a  stable  immigrant  inflow  and  legally  working  migrants  of  required
qualifications. However, this ideal pattern does not work.
                                                   
61 http://www.humanities.edu.ru/db/msg/41432
62 See, for example: http://www.gov.spb.ru/gov/admin/otrasl/c_foreign/toler
63 The Moscow Government Decree N: 1050 of 04.12.2007. At:
http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_132540.html75
In democratic societies, the effectiveness of the State policy, particularly in social
dimensions, is assessed according to altogether different criteria. Integration policy is an
essential part of immigration policy. Selectivity provides for the interests of the labor market /
employers, and at the same time it ensures that a migrant, if selected, enjoys social benefits and
appropriate treatment. An ‘effective migration policy’ results in a continuing comfort of life
and growing opportunities for human development, both for migrants and the local population.
This pattern may also seem idealistic but, when evaluated in the light of its effect on human
development, a migration policy like this results in a well-balanced union of humanism and
respect for human rights.
Design of a migration policy is a matter of political and public debate. The debate is to be
based on knowledge of the subject, its advantages and disadvantages, its past, present and
future. In this context, the Russian society and policy-makers are in dramatic contrast with, for
example, those in the USA, where the nation is created by immigration, and the social,
economic, cultural, and political aspects of immigration are thoroughly studied. The lack of
knowledge of the phenomenon of migration in Russia, a dominating alarmist approach, and a
stereotypes-driven decision making process make the Russian migration policy slack, reactive
and contradictory. The fact that there is no migration strategy and clearly defined purposes of
migration policy can be explained by a lack of development strategy detailed in economic
strategy, demographic strategy, social strategy, etc. In fact, the call for fertility growth and
resettlement of compatriots to cope with the current demographic crisis can hardly be taken
seriously.
The specific nature of the Russian political space originates in the fact that in the current
political structure there are no political parties or movements who could put to words and
lobby interests of any particular population groups. The most powerful and numerous party,
Yedinaya Rossia [United Russia] heralds itself as a ‘party of the nation’ and represents the
interests of bureaucrats, large and medium-size businesses, law-enforcement bodies, trade
unions, and even NGOs. Small-scale business is only just developing and is poorly organized.
The social institutions are inadequately developed. In this situation, a social multiparty
dialogue that would protect the migration policy from populist political claims and shape an
appropriate migration management mode supported by every side, is simply impossible.
Since the early 2000s, the migration policy in Russia has been developing under the
tough ‘line of command’ constructed by President Putin. His own understanding of what is
good and what is bad for Russia in terms of migration, was translated into various revisions of76
the migration legislation. One of the earliest decrees of President Medvedev validated the
existing practice: the Ministry of Interior and the affiliated Federal Migration Service are the
bodies ‘directly guided by the President of the Russian Federation.
64
The poor coordination between ministries involved in the migration issues has resulted in
a lack of the complex approach and the low transparency of the migration policy. The
president’s personal initiatives to restrict the migration policy in accordance with growing
security concerns in the early 2000s and an about-turn in 2006 suffered difficulties in
implementation, and were not supported with an information and interpretation campaign. The
following steps (ousting foreigners from the Russian market trade and a twofold reduction of
quotas for temporary residence permits for 2007 against 2006
65) were blatantly populist. A
deficit of a clear long-term migration strategy resulted in the work permits quota being axed
from 6 million in 2007 to 1.8 million in 2008, which caused a renewal of illegal employment
practices among Russian employers.
The Federal Migration Service that has already experienced an undeserved reassignment
at the turn of the decade is attempting to distance itself from the unpopular regulations and
obscure law revisions. A recent illustration is a statement by the Deputy Director of the FMS
A. Kuznetsov explaining that the law on a facilitated procedure of migrant registration was
adopted  by  the  Duma  while  the  Federal  Migration  Service  is  just  monitoring  its
implementation.
66
The recent shift towards an ‘open door’ migration policy is definitely positive in its
outcomes for migrants and their households. A wider access to legalization provides them with
the social support and labor rights. A compatriots-oriented programme supports people who
would like to come to Russia. The freedom of movement principle has not been revised despite
sharp debates on the national security and challenges related to uncontrolled inflows and
outflows of population. However, the realization of the post-totalitarian rights and freedoms by
ex-USSR citizens is often limited by the inconsistent migration policy, unspecified social
priorities, and continuing poverty. Besides, the preference of administrative instruments over
economic incentives in the migration policy inherited from the Soviet period; the non-
transparency and the priority of the State interests suggest the path dependence effect despite
all the radical changes in the Russian political life (Pierson 2000).
                                                   
64 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation N: 724 of 12.05.2008 ‘Structure of Federal Bodies of the Executive
Power’.
65 Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation N: 1637-p of 27.11.2006.
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